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1	  
Social and Urban Inquiries from a Curious and Inspired Visitor 	  
 I have always been drawn to my environments. I enjoy learning about their 
histories and how I place myself within them. Cities have a particular allure to me, largely 
because they are so multifaceted, each containing distinctive features. I’ve noticed in my 
years of moving and academic transitioning that individuals are highly influenced by 
environments. I felt this awareness acutely when I studied abroad in France for the spring 
of my junior year in Aix-en-Provence. 
 It was there abroad, with the multiple barriers I encountered – language, cultural, 
academic and individual, that I became most aware of my movements through space. It was 
the first time I was living in a foreign country for an extended period of time. I had to make 
changes to my daily habits due to the newness and unfamiliarity of Aix. One adjustment 
that I grew to love was my daily walk or commute by bus into the center of the city. I 
enjoyed the tranquil lull of the ride in the morning, listening to my ipod, but mostly, I 
enjoyed people watching. It was a perceptibly informative experience. It was almost as if in 
that moving space alone, I was discovering an obscure lesson about the cultural 
environment of French cities. 
In other French cities, using buses, the TGV train, and the Parisian metro brought 
to my attention both the attractiveness and accessibility of public transit. In my discussions 
with French students, cars for them were preferable, but as a foreigner, I developed an 
appreciation for the common good of public transportation. Mass utilization of public 
transit was opened up to me when I was abroad. 
Furthermore, I happened to be overseas during a rare match in politics for France 
and the United States. Only once every 201 years do their presidential election seasons align 
because of differing term lengths. Seeing news covering France’s presidential campaign as 
well the U.S.’s made clear our political differences. As an American, I was challenged 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Olivier Duhamel’s piece for an analysis on France’s political term lengths.  
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during the campaigning to explain exactly what it was that I noticed. Their domestic 
concerns, the economy, as well as social and civic issues were comparable, yet subtly and 
distinguishably different. One facet that did starkly stand out was France’s keen focus on 
social welfare projects to revitalize the state of its economy. Reading the current news, I 
came across respective political parties’ plans and goals, covering everything from boosting 
engineering and technology industries, to revitalizing their state infrastructure. All planning 
seemed to be based upon a social welfare oriented state that was striving to be 
capitalistically competitive. One specific plan I came across was the Grand Paris Express. It 
was this project that struck me as the most lucidly French. French because it aspires to 
solve their state’s economy through an infrastructural project that faces a new model, but 
with noticeably and somewhat poignantly French designed features. 
 From my perspective, it was these dual concepts, mass transit planning and the 
political and social environment that I found myself in, which ignited a fascination to 
more closely observe the underlying foundations of French cities and how they have 
grown over the years. From my location in and connection to them, I saw myself as an 
observer and temporary participant, able to communicate and pass through, but also 
unable to fully comprehend their histories. After my return back to the United States, I 
began to look at American cities and their arrangement with probing eyes. I wanted to 
understand what it was I sensed in their semblance and what made them different from 
French cities. 
It is for these reasons I want to preface beforehand that I am approaching this 
topic as an observant American from an academic angle. In my urban and social inquiries, 
I wish to remain neutral. However, delving into this issue presents areas for debate. My 
opinions presented come from my studies and interviews, as well as my American 
upbringing. This thesis is not intended to be comparative. However, the arguments I 
present forth pose the nature of the Grand Paris Express from my American perspective.
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The Grand Paris Express: A Vessel for Change in the Île-de-France 
 
 
 This thesis examines the Grand Paris Express project currently underway in the 
Île-de-France. The basis of this project is a series of new and renovated railway lines to 
connect and span across the entirety of the region. They are being planned with the hopes 
to improve urbanization for the outlying suburbs.  The Île-de-France is the wealthiest 
region in France, but it has high economic inequality between its departments. One hard 
hit area is Seine-St-Denis. This is the area I will be focusing primarily on.  Department 
number 93, its urban landscape holds histories of rioting, unemployment, and large 
immigrant populations. In its underdeveloped growth, residents are calling for socio-
spatial justice. Professor of Urban and Regional planning Edward Soja (1980) coins this as 
a “social-spatial dialectic” (208), where any given space is inherently political. Currently, 
residents in Department 93 are engaged in this “dialectic”, taking action by means of 
redefining the places where they live. In addition to demands for spatial equality is a more 
complex and hidden protest: the demand from marginalized citizens for an adjusted 
French ideology with respect to national identity. In their spatial marginalization, groups 
are contesting the egalitarian claims of the state based on where they live. I explore the 
historical significance of the Seine-St-Denis department in the Île-de-France’s urbanizing 
efforts. This thesis argues that planning for the Grand Paris Express represents the effects 
of a new French identity in formation. But while Paris is being recreated to accommodate 
those living in the outer communes, an anti-immigrant state narrative is also resulting in 
reformed urban planning in an existing discriminatory French ideology. However, as I 
plan to prove later in my research, the Grand Paris Express will provide more social 
access for France’s marginalized citizens. 
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Chapter One: The Grand Paris Express: Reasons, Causes, and Expectations 
  
 Paris is in the midst of a vast metamorphosis. The Société du Grand Paris, a state-
owned company that works with regional government representatives, is currently 
moving forward with planning a new network of rail transit. First envisioned by Nicholas 
Sarkozy in 2007, the Grand Paris Express is comprised of four lines that will connect the 
outer suburbs to one another and central Paris. Completion of the lines and utilization is 
expected from 2018 to 2025.2 There are high hopes and expectations for this project. The 
new series of lines envision a well-connected and economically booming region. At a 
parallel moment, France’s middle class is slowly transforming. Though unknown to most, 
even with frequent discrimination, entry into middle class status is slowly occurring. The 
means of this result from public schooling, free access to state-supported universities 
usually outside city centers and the resources available from civic associations. 
Historically marginalized, immigrants of North-African and Maghribi descent are 
establishing their place in more secure jobs.3  This subtle shift is creating a more 
heterogeneous middle class. Moreover, in the recent 2012 French Presidential elections, 
there was the highest reported turnout of non-European country votership in the Île-de-
France region, changing politically and demographically the face of French participation 
in its democratic processes. During the presidential campaigns, there was strong criticism 
against Sarkozian rhetoric and his failed economic promises for the state. Jean-Marie Le 
Guen, the deputy mayor of health in Paris, stresses the disconnect Sarkozy held from the 
general public in his visions for a Grand Paris. Disillusioned with a “want for grandeur” 
he was blind to an actual need for a “revolution” (jmlg.fr). In critiquing his presidency, 
Le Guen stresses the need for more egalitarian democratic practices in France.4 Similar to 
France’s new middle class, the Grand Paris project is multiform as well. While founded 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Le Grand Paris. Projected timeline from the société du grand Paris.  
3 Wenden, Catherine Wihtol, 3.  
4 Jean-Marie Le Guen.  
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under his administration, Sarkozy’s Grand Paris is no longer under state governance 
alone. The expansion of regional transit signifies a significant step of outer periphery 
integration into French Society.  
 In my political and historical analyses, the immediate attention to widespread 
transit planning and regional development occurring in the Île-de-France is a direct tie to 
the rioting of 2005. At its outbreak, two teenage boys of Malian and Tunisian descent, 
Zyed Benna, and Bouna Traoré, were electrocuted after they climbed into an electricity 
relay station while fleeing police.5 The incident set off a cascade of emotions, anger and 
riots across suburbs in France. The events left the country deeply shaken and disturbed by 
the levels of violence and despair. Described by the French press as both émeutes (riots) 
and as révoltes (rebellions), (42) the degree of violence and destruction carried out made 
it clear that for a long time, tension and national dissent had been boiling in Paris’s outer 
departments. 6  Beginning in late October in Clichy-Sous-Bois, burning of cars, schools, 
and public buildings spread out to other French cities. There was such a high degree of 
destruction that executive measures were ordered by Prime Minister Villepin, including a 
limited state of emergency and curfew, which had not been enabled since the 1955 law 
adopted during the Algerian war.7 Additionally, in efforts to reach out to the Parisian 
suburbs, Villepin rallied youth under the state’s Republican values, pledging money, jobs, 
teacher aids for schools in state-classified bad areas, and state-delegated prefects for 
equal opportunity.8 In their chaotic and unorganized behavior, the riots propelled French 
officials and policy makers into addressing the multitude of problems, youth 
unemployment, poor housing, and discrimination in the banlieues.9    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For a detailed account see Soumahoro, Maboula 
6 For more analysis of rioting framework see, Balibar, Etienne, and James Ingram.  
7 Wenden, 2.  
8 Ossman, Terrio. 6. 
9 I use the term banlieue (the French word for suburb) in my thesis because it carries a specific 
French linguistic colloquialism that is not associated with the American idea of a suburb. For 
scholars on this issue see Waddington (2009), Dikeç (2006).  
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 Characteristics of the rioting were primarily around burning cars and public 
buildings, and investigation into the reasons given behind the events ranged from youth 
unemployment and lack of opportunities to radical Islam insurgency.10 This civil unrest, 
explicitly presented by the widespread rioting across all of France, illustrates that 
discontentment moved beyond unemployment and limited social access. Instead, it has 
led to a state of social exclusion and isolation. Hypotheses about the riots and their roots 
have been examined in many social, political, and economic realms.  
 Cesari, a principal research fellow at the National Center for Scientific Research 
in Paris and associated professor at Harvard University, argues that violence in the 
suburbs is nothing new, rather, the banlieues of Paris have had a longstanding period of 
urban degradation. This urban decay is now socially adjoined to the residents who live in 
these social housing establishments. Crucial to avoid is associating and conflating the 
discourse based on race, ethnicity, religion, and poverty.11 Kastoryano, a senior research 
fellow at the CNRS asserts that there is no relevantly new basis of the rioting, that they 
only lasted longer as a result of a rage that has settled into the outer peripheries of the Île-
de-France.12 From an economic standpoint, a root cause of the riots was simply the 
staggeringly low employment rate of the young in France. A large concentration of them 
were especially, low-skilled young men.13 Resolving these issues through more access to 
jobs, school, and reformed policies for equal opportunity remains the dominant narrative. 
In as much as they are effective, questions of long and short-term outcomes from these 
policies are what is of key importance. However, as Salanié, professor of economics at 
Columbia University and École Polytechnique concludes, “policies seem to be more 
directed towards the symptoms than towards the causes; they satisfy the public’s cry for 
immediate action, but they do not attack the roots of the disease” (6).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Wenden 1. 
11 Cesari, 6. 
12 Kastoryano 7.  
13 Salanie, 1. 
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 These arguments immediately following the rioting were all close examinations of  
failure. The failure of residential livelihood in the banlieues was ignored by state 
governance.  As providers of social housing welfare, the state was sheltered away from 
the real failures looming upon them in the onset of the riots. It is difficult to say if there 
was a complete and utter blindness to what was to come. Then, two years later, in a vastly 
ambitious and sweeping address to the French republic, Sarkozy presented his Grand 
Paris plan as one that would absolve economic disparity through beautiful park additions, 
state of the art transit systems and renovated housing. It was to all help progress Paris  
simultaneously into its power as a capitalist, global city.14 By no mere coincidence, 
Sarkozy’s plan was presented in an overarching and grandiose manner to transition Paris 
into a “global city.” In plainer terms, Sarkozy’s speech can be stripped to one feature. 
The memory of the rioting two years earlier was still at the forefront of the state’s mind, 
and they needed a solution to absolve it immediately. The demands from these residents 
on Paris’s peripheries have been contextualized into a grander, idealistic vision for the 
future of the Île-de-France. At the basis of Sarkozy’s vision for a  “global city” is a 
turbulent protest from a disunited citizenry of France. Yet in their disunity, the rioters 
proved to be the rooted and effective catalyst for Sarkozy’s urban, neo-liberal expansion.  
 For the banlieues today, it is imperative to look at the effects of these riots on a 
changed state discourse towards equality and the direction that regional planners for 
Grand Paris Express have taken. There is no doubt that the riots sparked a heightened 
awareness of the glaring inequalities between those living in the center of French cities 
those who lived on their outskirts. The problems brought up are multi-fold. To begin, the 
Île-de-France region is organized in very economically segregated poles, though not in 
the traditional core outer periphery form as is normally the case. Rather there is an East 
and West split. Thus, the low-income classes are found concentrated in Seine-Saint-Denis, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See Sarkozy’s inaugural address of the Grand Paris.   
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one of the Île-de-France’s 8 departments in the North Eastern part of the city. What 
makes explaining the riots so difficult are their multiple frameworks for interpretation.   
 When he was interior minister to France, Nicolas Sarkozy described the problem 
as street gang members fighting over drug territory. In other veins, members of the 
political far right described Muslim fundamentalism as the foundation of the rioting.15 In 
the wide array of social and political misrepresentation, residents faced a void of avenues 
for agency and political mobilization. Clearly the rioting was not being attributed to any 
singular root cause. Yet in its ambiguousness, it created individual political movements 
that have proven to be both effective and problematic in addressing the fundamental 
needs of residents living in outlying banlieues. As with all democratic institutions, 
through the governing framework already established, the needs of some citizens are 
simply not addressed. However, the political power they did hold through their violence 
incited responses from the state, media and the world at large.  This in and of itself, 
places these residents in a political position of power. What is important to address is 
how much rhetoric has stemmed away from the racialized, drug warring, Islamophobic 
sentiments against these residents towards an appeasement for economic and democratic 
equality.    
 Planning for future public transportation, as formally addressed by Sarkozy in 
2009, provides a glimmer of social mobility for the residents in Seine-St-Denis. Initially 
laid out as the mètro grand Paris by the French central government in 2009, the Grand 
Paris Express is now a comprised government and regional project. Members of the 
Société du Grand Paris voted unanimously in May 2011 for its planning16. A massive 
project, the new metro lines will cover 175km with 72 new stations. Preliminary 
construction and planning has started with official construction beginning in 2014, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See Mestries (2007).   
16 For projected plans see Freemark.  
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full completion in 2025. The budget is 20.5 billion Euros but there are still issues about 
where funding will come from as far as regional and state budgeting is concerned.17  
 The Paris metro system supports and sustains the flow and function of the city. Of 
the 11.5 million inhabitants in the Île-de-France region, almost 60% of all trips are made 
by foot, bus or train. Even with expansion, the city’s growth has remained dense and 
compact, creating access to transit systems for the majority of residents.18 However, the 
outer departments do not have a reliable method, relying on tramways and buses with 
slow speeds and limited access to transportation into the city. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Map of Current RER Lines19 
 
 In a series of heavily debated public meetings and conferences between local, 
regional and national officials, the Grand Paris Express will be the largest transit 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 For coverage of debates see Vincendon’s Grand Paris et Petit Detours. 
18 Freemark, 2. 
19 “Les Réseaux de transports en Île-de-France: Réseaux express regional” http://www.stif.fr.  
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expansion on the continent and one of the most massive in the world.20 As laid out by the 
Société du Grand Paris, a comprised national and commercial company for the Grand 
Paris Express, the specific focus of the project is to build the lines and facility structures 
that will promote quicker transit and easier access for residents on the outskirts of Paris. 
The new focus on the outer departments is a direct investment to provide mass transit that 
is as efficient as Paris’s renowned underground metro system.   
  
Figure 2. Map of Planned Grand Paris Express Lines21 
 
 Pictured in figure 2, the four new lines cover impressive ground. Focusing 
specifically on the Seine-Saint-Denis department, where rioting began in 2005, residents  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Freemark, 2.  
21 “La carte du projet” Société du Grand Paris, grandparis.fr Mar. 2013. 
http://www.societedugrandparis.fr/la-carte-du-projet.  
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are receiving a large circular line. In total, it will cover 100 km with a speed between 55 
and 60 km/h.22 This red line will directly connect the northeastern neighborhood towns to 
one another and other departments of Paris, with aims to cut back on commuter travel 
time. Construction of tramway lines makes routes ideal between suburbs and denser 
neighborhoods, where movement is more controlled to regional areas in and around Paris. 
Thus, by creating a new orbital corridor, the neighborhoods in and around Seine-St-Denis 
are more easily accessible one to the other via a tramway route. From the orbital corridors 
already existent in the central city, these new tramways will create a larger ring of 
movement, encouraging development throughout the suburbs themselves.23 By final 
completion, the Grand Paris Express will encircle and connect the Île-de-France’s 8 
departments through its four new orbital corridors.  
 Since their initial construction and planning, the banlieues lacked adequate means 
of transportation. Transportation for the masses is a fundamental aspect of city planning, 
and in comparison to most American cities, France provides efficient means of public 
transportation. At the heart of Paris is the metro itself: providing the very essence of 
mobility for Parisians with fast and frequent service. Buses and tramways to the outlying 
suburbs provide mobility but are inadequate in providing a system that works for the 
masses in the outer corridors of Paris.24 For the purposes of looking at where this project 
began, it is important to ask where the need was first addressed.  
 Prior to the project’s passing, local and regional campaigning in the Île-de-France 
region passed measures to create solutions for inadequate metro lines. It was at this point 
that disagreements met at the national and regional level. After Sarkozy’s large proposal, 
many regional planners argued that his plan, in its right to use “eminent domain in station 
area zones” would essentially produce “bourgeois enclaves” providing little for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Société du Grand Paris, “Ligne Rouge”. Le Grand Paris Express: Le Métro du Grand Paris. 
11/05/2012. Web.  
23 Yonah. 1. 
24 Ibid. 2 
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existing adjacent communities.25 It is at this point that the need arises for the unique 
situation of the Île-de-France: while the city has the most efficient public transportation, 
the dense surrounding suburbs have limited transit.  
 At the national and regional level, joint forces provide the funding and planning 
for the additional orbital lines. However, this need has been implicit for the outer 
banlieues of Paris since their inception. Why at this moment are there multiple levels of 
governance to address the lack of transportation for the residents of these outer 
neighborhoods? The framework of the Grand Paris Express was organized under the 
convergence of the Arc Express and the Public Transport Network of Grand Paris, 
(RTPGP) whose overall goals aligned for transit-led development.26 According to 
Theresa Enright, whose dissertation examines Sarkozy’s Grand Paris project, the 
scheming for the Grand Paris Express has been executed with conservative neo-liberal 
policies in mind.27 Planning and construction are oriented around economic growth, 
competition, and private investment, which can only reproduce the social and spatial 
hierarchies it sets out to address. Therefore the Grand Paris Express is run solely through 
an elite class that has access to wealth and decision making powers. Thus, this project is 
only a dominating process of urban spatial production. Furthermore, it will only 
depoliticize the invention of common worlds.28 Taken from this standpoint, the process of 
urbanization for the banlieues looks bleak.  
  
 
The Literature on French Urban Planning and Sociology 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Ibid. 3.  
26 For an in depth examination of the Grand Paris’s development and converging of state and 
regional actors see, Enright, (2012). 
27 Enright, 145. 
28 Ibid, 4.  
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 In converging the urban planning and political discourse underway in the Île-de-
France region, this thesis begins by outlining multiple schools of thought that address the 
spatial, political, and socio-economic problems residents in Seine-Saint-Denis face.  
Surrounding scholarship in American and French literature discusses the problems of the 
rioting and inequalities for residents in the neighborhoods of Seine St. Denis as implicit 
problems for France’s failure to address its immigration and integration policies colliding 
with a state narrative of égalité and universalism. Furthermore, in looking at the urban 
growth and planning of Paris it is apparent that spatial segregation has continually 
resulted despite France’s efforts for social mixite. This convergence of spatial planning 
and national identity has resulted in many contesting ideas over the future of France’s 
approach to immigration and integration.  
 
Race, Class, Nation: Explaining the Riots 
 What transpired after les émeutes has been taken into the larger context of 
addressing contesting ideological views of a French national identity. An issue heavily 
debated in current social and political discourse is the stubborn resistance both 
ideologically and institutionally in the French republic over dissenting views of French 
égalité. In terms of France’s staunch admission to state secularism or laïcité, Balibar 
warns that to address the events in merely Huntington’s “clash of civilization terms” and 
“religious fact” would, “make it a mere cloak of ‘real’ social processes when it is in fact a 
component of them, and against the temptation of a ‘religious (or culturalist-theological) 
reading’ of current conflicts, that for its part, conceals real dynamics.”29 The real 
dynamics that Balibar discusses in this case illustrates a paradigm of a social struggle not 
addressed by the French government. The civil unrest that spread across the outskirts of 
Paris is reflective of a group of citizens subsumed by a Universalist perspective on 
French society. Therefore, to assess the problems of the rioting as merely the clash of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Balibar 55.  
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religious differences between Muslim immigrants and a secular state would be an 
oversimplified assumption of a more socially complex issue.  
 In their book Race Class Nation, Étienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein draw 
upon the discourse of “Western Marxism,” and contend that the problem of racism is not 
actually receding but progressing into the contemporary world.30 Balibar begins by 
claiming there is a new racism, a neo-racism that is now dominant in contemporary 
French society. He writes, 
 “It is a racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the 
insurmountability of cultural differences, a racism which, at first sight, does not 
postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to others but 
‘only’ the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles 
and traditions31”  
 
There is a fear that France is loosing cultural unity, where a collective identity is being 
taken away. Balibar emphasizes throughout his arguments that at the core of the French 
nation-state is an implicit enforcement of assimilation based off of the collective need to 
have a shared identity. The French uphold their conception of the nation state as an 
equalizing basis shared by all citizens. However, Balibar argues that racism is incarnated 
inherently from a French nationalism. He writes, “In France, the elaboration of an 
ideology of the ‘French race’ rooted in the past of ‘the soil and the dead’, coincides with 
the beginning of mass immigration.” 32 The influx of immigrants has resulted in a 
simultaneous concern for France’s national identity. But concerning the concept that 
France is encountering a ‘new-racism,’ as Balibar argues, ignores that a class-based 
racism has been implicit in the French mindset since its 19th century belle époque. In 
many ways the neo-racism is merely a reincarnation of the class based racism, where the 
new workers are now merely the large stream of mass immigration to France.   
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32 Balibar, Wallerstein, 53.  
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 Returning to his examination of race, class and the French nation state, Balibar 
examines the multiple factors that contributed to the riots. His findings present that in one 
sense, the riots were the manifestations of an uprising from an unsupported group of 
society separate from the political power based on their race and class status. This 
combination illustrates the integral tie between his previous neo-racism and an older 
embedded class discrimination. He writes about the exclusivity of the political process 
and how the,  
“fusion of racial and class exclusions on which I insisted above: precisely to 
precipitate, and to sanction, the exteriority of the new populace in relation to 
‘politics’ – all the more effectively to the extent that class discrimination is 
assumed not to exist” (63) 33  
 
Thus, the rioters, left with no political avenues were cornered into a separate sphere of 
political action, which manifested into violence and social turmoil. Balibar describes the 
extremity of violence as both self-destructive and narcissistic given their powerlessness 
in the political spectrum. 34 While the act of rioting can be self-destructive to the capital 
of the actors involved and narcissistic because of its ostensibly purposeless incentives, 
the rioting from the youth has resulted in strong policy changes, suggesting that riots can 
serve a higher political purpose than Balibar originally assumed. Because the rioters had 
no other political avenues, their actions were focalized on as heavily violent relative to 
other more democratic processes.  
 In his explanation of the use of burning cars and buildings as an expression of 
rage, the location of the cités themselves, “is the subject of violence, claimed by the 
young rioters as a place of origin, stigmatized by politicians, police, employers, chosen as 
a ‘target’ of social policy and the terrain of police ‘raids.” 35 According to Balibar, these 
cités, grands ensembles, and banlieues, predominately inhabited by minority groups, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Balibar, 63. 
34  Ibid, 64. 
35 Balibar, Etienne, and James Ingram.  
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have felt ostracized and stigmatized by French society, causing a ‘revolt of the excluded’. 
36 Subjecting where the rioting took place clarifies the strong separation of groups in the 
departments within the Île-de-France, which had a major impact on the identity rioters 
took upon themselves, as the present “other” outside of central Paris, and an “other” 
outside of its social context.  
French Intégration: Le Pari Difficile 
 
 Manuel Boucher makes many observations about social integration and 
assimilation in modern day France and the effects that ethnicity, class, regionality, and 
social norms play for immigrants coming to France. In his book, Les Théories de 
l’intégration Entre Universalisme et Differentialisme, he examines the debates in 
contemporary France over the widely accepted, universalism, versus approaching the 
rupture through a multi-culturalist approach. For immigrants coming into France, 
Boucher explains the dominating vein of sociological discourse is for the acceptance of 
French societal values. He describes,  
“L’appréciation de l’assimilation d’un étranger se fonde sur un ensemble 
d’élements, au premier rang desquels se situent l’usage et la connaissance du 
français, ainsi que la participation à la vie sociale.”37   
 
There is an assumption for all immigrants an immediate recognition of and acquiescence 
to the distinct valorized factors of being French. As Boucher comments however, with 
growing concerns over a French national identity, there is a growing concern for the 
problematic issues the French model of integration poses. For one, acceptance of and 
adjustment to a French identity with the abandonment of old cultural values has proven 
impossible. National identity and cultural values and norms are intrinsically linked. To 
drop one’s previous culture and adopt another cannot be achieved through state 
governance and issue to assimilation.  	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 In its efforts to prevent a fragmented society, France emphasizes the common 
thread of citizenship and adhesion to the Republic so that its citizens will not heed to 
ruptures and social cleavages. A fragmented society is one of the greater fears of French 
society. From national rhetoric,  
“La tradition républicaine française ne connaît qu’un ennemi de la nation et de la 
République: la guerre civile…Dans ce cadre, un ‘bon citoyen’ intégré est celui qui 
préserve la paix civile en respecteant les lois et les droits de tous et en oubliant ses 
particularismes, que ceux-ci soient d’ordre religieux, ethnique ou même de 
classe”38  
 
Yet it is precisely from the national rhetoric of a unified, secure nation state that a highly 
cleavaged France has emerged. Oppositionally, there is resistance from immigrants 
integrating into the society and resistance from those already living in France. For 
immigrants moving to France, assimilation and integration into the social sphere is more 
than a matter of assimilation but also acceptance. It is acceptance from both sides, the 
outsider immigrants in their new and unfamiliar environment, and those espousing 
French cultural and societal norms that are necessary.  
 According to Boucher, France has reached a moment where it can no longer 
sustain its method of intégration. As globalization and mass immigration continue, 
France is at a crossroads and turning point, structurally changing their policies, but 
struggling to change their cultural attitudes. Emphasized in the department of Seine-
Saint-Denis, these residents are assumed outside members of the cultural context of 
France and are appropriated and dealt with through classifications of race, religion, class, 
and age.  
 
 
 
A Social Control of the City? 	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 Another examination of the banlieues of Paris is a case study conducted by 
Gendrot, whose book, The Social Controls of Cities?: A Comparative Perspective, 
examines the possible correlations between the impact of globalization on the city, the 
growth of inequalities and of power conflicts, and the violence and crime evident in what 
are often spatially segregated areas.39 In her analysis she draws comparisons between 
French and American cities and their relative levels of urban violence and struggle.  
 In her findings related to Seine-St-Denis, Gendrot observes the effects of spatial 
polarization in Paris and specifically the degree to which Seine-St-Denis’s neighborhoods 
are struck by unemployment, poverty, crime, and a concentration of new immigrants. She 
attributes these qualities to its roots as an “old working-class suburb” where “upward 
social mobility was seen as an electoral threat by communist mayors.”40 Historicizing the 
political context of Seine-Saint-Denis places those living there with limited social 
mobility in their efforts to move forward. What she poses as the most current problem for 
Seine-St-Denis, however, are its public schools and public buses.41 Lacking the resources 
for good transportation and schools, residents are further displaced from access to social 
capital. In addressing these problems, Gendrot observes the participatory action of local 
actors to give agency to the community. However, in her conclusions on the power of 
social mobility and agency for marginalized actors, she states, “local governance and 
empowerment remain, nevertheless, ambiguous notions.”42 The unpredictability of the 
roles local actors play could not be made clearer after the rioting that took place in Seine-
St.-Denis in 2005. Gendrot’s study of Seine-St-Denis contributes to the discourse of 
political mobilization of smaller group actors, but the level of mobilization and degree to 
which it can affect policy was not taken into account.  
 In her subsequent case study of social segregation Gendrot makes a contradictory 
observation about the pluralistic center of Marseilles. She observes that its center is, in 	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41 Ibid, 189. 
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fact, very diverse where, “Everywhere, French nationality prevails alongside a 
multicultural mix…the city having been molded by multiple migratory flux.”43  This 
marked contrast to Paris, which, like Marseilles, has a statistically high population of 
immigrants, does not confirm a sound form of fragmented localities existent in French 
cities.  
 Furthermore, in her comparative case studies on “world status44” cities, she 
categorizes New York and Chicago with Paris, Lyon, and Marseilles, creating an over-
generalized, broad platform for observing the evolutions of city violence. Drawing upon 
differences from national cities, as exemplified in her case study of Marseilles, presents 
the problematic “globalized economic” approach she uses in explaining the dynamics of 
social control in cities. Each of her analyses contains elements of truth in addressing how 
marginalized communities act in terms of their spatial construction. But for a cohesive, 
concrete understanding of the governing and spatial roles at stake in these different cities, 
her argument is abstracted to a large degree of discord and incongruence in her findings.  
 
 
Constructing Spatial Inequality 
 
 In terms of its historical construction, the Île-de-France and social integration of 
the classes at the time in Paris were given consideration and planning to transform the 
city from its position as a monarch center to a cohesive city. In the planning conducted by 
Haussmann and the second empire, Paris was planned out and idealized as a city with 
promenades, parks, and schools available to all classes. Yet in his research on Paris’s 
renowned urban planner, Howard Saalman critiques that in Haussman’s revisioning of 
the country’s capitol, the Second Empire was reinstilling spatially unequal norms 
between the classes. Because the vision of the new Paris was comprised through an elite 	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class, the class divides were only reproduced in newly designed schemes. He explains, 
“The lower middle and working classes of France did not have the organized political 
power required, and the Second Empire found it possible to neglect their demands if not 
to ignore them altogether”45 Thus, even in its 19th century revisionist approach, lines of 
social and economic status were not addressed and implemented for integration, but 
rather redrawn out and reconstructed into the 20th and now present day. Salmaan 
concludes,  
“Parks, large and small, monuments, churches, public buildings, sewers, water 
mains, and boulevards were distributed more or less equally throughout all parts 
of the city. Political pressure from the upper as well as the working classes saw to 
that. But the unpromising policy of using urban reconstruction as an instrument of 
social revolution was decidedly not part of Haussman’s or Napolean III’s 
thinking”46  
 
Yet even disregarding the foresight to social revolutions infers that there is a tendency to 
fear the idea of recreating space and the urban landscape, the recreation of Paris was set 
forth from a centralized, private, and cohesive group of political and economic elite. 
Involvement from the working class was only present in terms of their political 
participation, which during the second empire was by no means strong. To argue that 
there was no social foresight in the urban planning of Paris is to disregard entirely the fact 
that a city is comprised of socially different classes. The makers of the game are those 
who have the economic and political power.  
 Moving forward into the 20th century, it soon became clear that Paris itself was 
the central and idealized place to live. This concentration of production and wealth in the 
city center contrasts with the living conditions and work available to those living on the 
outside of the city, visible by the 1950’s in examining the living conditions. In his 
analysis of the construction of the French new towns, James M. Rubenstein critiques that 
from the forefront, Paris had an unequal distribution of wealth centered around the capitol 
that did not reach out to the peripheries. He writes,  	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“The intense competition for space in central Paris has priced the poor out of the 
market. They must live in peripheral projects that have all of the negative features 
of suburban living and none of the positive…Jobs are far away, requiring long-
distance commuting on frequently inadequate public transportation systems. Most 
of the social problems are found in these suburban areas”47  
 
From his analysis in the late 70’s, the problems of spatial inequalities were already made 
clear. The centralization of wealth, jobs, and classes was concentrated in the center of 
Paris and not equally distributed out to mixed housing as many politicians and urban 
policy rhetoric envisioned. Furthermore, the planning policies that did go underway, 
called the grands ensembles, were organized in a complex administrative structure made 
up of the national government, local authorities, and public and private developers.48 This 
creation of a multilayered administration split up private and public funding, housing 
development, and created an ineffective transportation for citizens to come into central 
Paris. As evidenced today, the level of integrated public and private planning for the 
Grand Paris Express is just as thoroughly demarcated and mixed in various realms of 
planning and development. In a sense, the multi-fractioned development of planning is 
both a repercussion of and improvement upon previous city planning for the greater 
region of Paris. Because it is so fragmented and because there is a more cohesive social 
discourse that stemmed from a direct need for more feasible and efficient means of access 
in and around the city, the vision for the Grand Paris Express is one that will sufficiently 
bring more public transportation to all of the areas of the Île-de-France. 
 In his comparative analysis of the French new towns with American suburb towns, 
Rubenstein argues that these towns, developed after the grands ensembles, were 
effectively socially integrated because they were, “planned to promote social balance.”49 
However, the visionaries of these new towns and the grands ensembles, were effectively 
from the same administration. The focus on increasing jobs, providing more shopping 
facilities, and movement was only isolating these new towns away from the employment 	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49 Ibid, 89.  
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locations in central Paris. Thus, instead of creating more integration into central Paris and 
its peripheral cités and grands ensembles, the planning underway only made more 
isolationist communes. His prediction of the isolated community resulted in unequal 
conditions to such a degree that rioting took root throughout all of France, suggesting that 
the deprivation in the cités was about more than just poor living conditions alone.  
 
Who now constructs the Île-de-France?  
 
 Moving forward to current examinations of the planning underway for urbanizing 
Paris, recent scholarship argues that there are detrimental consequences for residents in 
the outlying neighborhoods in light of the increasing urbanization of Paris. In her 
dissertation, Building a Grand Paris: French Neoliberalism and the Politics of Urban 
Spatial Production, Theresa Enright examines the objectives in the planning for Grand 
Paris, and the problematic recursive claims it poses in bringing about social cohesion for 
socio-economically disadvantaged groups. Thus, while Grand Paris aims to eradicate 
economic disparities between marginalized groups living on its outskirts, ultimately the 
project is perpetuating the very problems it sets out to address.50 In a similar vein, Sophie 
Gonick discusses the implications for President Sarkozy’s initial planning for Grand 
Paris in her piece, Disciplining the Metropolis: Grand Paris, Immigration, and the 
Banlieues and how, in contingency with his state policies, the goal for social mixité is not 
achieved. What results from the, “confluence of policy and planning ultimately heightens 
differentiation and inequality51.” In essence then, this heightened inequality stems from 
the government policies originally created to address the socio-economic divide for those 
living in the department of Seine-St-Denis. She concludes that for the utopian ideal of the 	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social mixité that France aims for, in light of current national rhetoric, “many, it would 
seem, do not want a system that enfolds their immigrant brethren into French polity52.” 
Now France is left in a paradoxical physical urbanizing and expansion, with furthering 
societal constraints and protectionist objectives.  
 Interestingly though, while planning for Grand Paris and the Grand Paris 
Express were primarily executed and organized by national governing bodies, elite 
architects and a coalescence of private sector and public urban planning groups, I contend 
by the mere fact that the call began from local, marginalized actors, their political power 
and sway remains an integral component of planning and organizing for the Grand Paris 
Express. Furthermore, in the altering socio-political discourse, these local actors are 
actually strong determiners of changing policy in the Île-de-France Region and the 
French state.  
 Looking at the scholarship surrounding the Grand Paris Express and the rioting 
that occurred in 2005 is the tendency to overwrite the prolific power that these riots had 
in making a significant change in regional and transit planning for the Île-de-France. It is 
here that I bring in the work of James C. Scott, who spent two years in a small 
community in Malaysia examining peasant resistance. In his work, he examines the 
multiple ways in which peasants resist ideological domination through small, hidden, 
daily acts of resistance. He contends that their individual acts of foot dragging and 
evasion, reinforced by the venerable act of resistance has a multiplier effect.  Continued a 
thousand-folds over, these individual acts may, in the end, make an utter shambles of the 
policies dreamed up by their would-be superiors in the capital.53 Therein, by mere 
resistance to hegemonic ideologies, repressed actors hold political and even sociological 
power.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Ibid, 39. 
53 For more on peasant resistance, Scott (1985) presents insightful observance on seemingly 
unpolitical acts in rural Malaysia. While drawn up in a different context, his work sheds valuable 
light to political acts occurring in isolated incidences worldwide.  
	  	  
24	  
 Of key concern to Scott are the effects that peasant resistance can have on the 
hegemonic state and its capitalist system. Rather than succumbing to their appropriated 
class and social status, local actors hold sway in their actions against their system of 
oppression. For peasants in Malaysia, these acts are hidden, compulsive and in some 
ways indulgent. They operate through these “hidden transcripts” and not other open 
forms of protest because it is in their self-interests to do so. Heavily embedded within the 
capitalist system of oppression, organized, political acts are unattainable and near 
impossible.54  However their individual acts, collectively in and of themselves provide a 
narrative of political protest. Scott concludes, “At different times and places they have 
defended themselves against the corvée…against the inroads of capitalism…against the 
modern capitalist state, and, it must be added, against many purportedly socialist states as 
well” (302). In their continuity, hidden protest amasses itself in addressing the larger 
issues at stake. 
  At first glance, the societal issues affecting the Île-de-France seem a far cry from 
peasant resistance in Malaysia. Yet similar to a peasant’s hidden transcript, the continuity 
of dissatisfaction within the French state from residents in Seine-St.-Denis amassed itself 
to riots. What’s more, the degree of an open, collective revolt against the French state 
lead to direct revisions in policy measures for a more integrated and urbanized Île-de-
France region. It is my argument that contrary to current claims about the true nature of 
the Grand Paris Express, the riots created a fundamental change for the political and 
urban landscape in the Île-de-France region, resulting in an adjusted French ideology 
regarding urban policy.  
 The riots that began in Clichy-Sous-Bois and later expanded to other areas of 
France were a means of political mobilization that created policy changes at the national 
level. Beginning as a form of constructive control from the national government, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Scott discusses how these peasants perform these acts through a series of hidden transcripts, 
foot dragging, stealing, loitering, and slaughtering livestock as a means of defying a totalitarian 
class order.  
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coalescence of local and state actors has changed the direction of integration within 
France.  
 
Methodology and Limitations 
 
 For my methodology, I have a wide berth of gathered findings from multiple 
mediums. Interviews, economic determiners, and social urban transit theories are all a 
part of my areas of study. For this reason, my data gathering is not conducive to one 
specific approach. My historical analyses are close examinations of past and current 
discourses on societal issues rooted to economic, social, and housing problems. I have 
decided that these are three core components directly tied to the rioting of 2005. I will 
assess the impact of these issues be examining the policy measures undertaken by the 
Société du Grand Paris for extension of the Île-de-France’s orbital corridors. Additionally 
I have conducted informational interviews centered on urban and social affairs with 
representatives of NGO organizations in the region. Finally, I will examine the political 
narrative in France, and how it has altered in regards to more societal welfare for 
normally marginalized groups in France.  I argue that the changes in planning are both a 
reflection of state and local actors striving to find a balance of economic expansion 
through a state endeavored project.  
 I plan to use this methodology in order to provide the corollary ties between 
citizenship and participative involvement through civic communities and organizing as 
they are related to the rioting of 2005.   
 
Limitations 
 
 Foremost, is my variety of channels and avenues of social involvement in 
presenting my argument. The department of Seine-Saint-Denis in particular remains 
difficult to address for their economic and societal needs. Residents there have objectives 
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that are as multifaceted as the rioting that began in 2005. Thus, to ascertain that their 
needs are concerned with the specific constraints of unmet mobility could prove to be an 
overarching assumption. Another problem posed by my analysis is the subjectivity 
present in the planning for the Grand Paris Express. While enacted into French legislation, 
state funding is still a contentious issue for the public and regional officials. Towards 
whom the Grand Paris Express serves is categorically a claim that cannot be met yet.55 
For example, ridership and utilization of other mass transport as well as commuting 
distances to other areas of Île-de-France could provide demonstrative insight in 
determining if ring corridors are better than additional rail lines and tramways. This thesis 
digresses away from quantifiable data sets normally seen in political science and transit 
planning. Rather, I take an ethnographical and theory based approach. Finally, to justify 
my contention that effective mobilization is transgressing from a politically void voice to 
one that is active and effective in current political discourse is difficult to argue in 
demographic terms. For one, French census polling is purely based on economic 
income.56 Thus in my efforts to prove discrimination in regards to race in French society 
is limited. The Société du Grand Paris is invariably a bureaucratic organization, however, 
there is large votership in France all around, rather than just specifically marginalized 
groups, leading me to believe that lobbies set forth by other organizations are working 
effectively in the region.  
 While most scholarship and studies suggest that policy prescriptions set forth by 
the Grand Paris Express will only further economic segregation (Gonick, 2011 Enright, 
2012), I argue that from the national trend of state and local governance acting in 
partnership, the multiple actors provides a narrative that moves away from the Sarkozian 
approach, towards one that will incorporate and provide more of the social mixite that the 
French Republic aims towards. The planning of the new metro line leads to an altering of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 See the law and its articles: LOI n°2010-597 du 3 juin 2010 relative au Grand Paris 
56 For explorations on the “color-blind” aspect in France, see Oppenheimer (2007) and his 
comparisons of equal opportunities in the US and France.   
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the physical landscape with social mobilization at the local level.  
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Chapter Two: Through the Eyes of Paris’s Architects 
 Building Different Identities through Expansion 
The positioning of Paris, in its varied dimensions and forms, tells as much of a 
history about its inhabitants as those who created it. In the Île-de-France region especially, 
there is a heightened awareness of the separation and distinctions of space in how spliced 
and organized the quarters into communes and finally to departments have been 
constructed over time. In its early beginnings, the growth of central Paris was seen as a 
historically momentous and pivotal moment of progression into the 20th century. The 
Haussmanizing of Paris, as it is commonly called, transformed the medieval empire into a 
world renowned and revered masterpiece. Following this meticulously planned city was 
poor attention to the complexity of growth soon presented beyond Paris.  In addition to 
the age of industrialization, the inevitable growth to follow was population in the city.  
In looking at current planning for the Île-de-France region, one naturally must 
look at its positioning in relation to the roots of Paris, Baron Haussman’s renovation, 
followed by extensive years of quick and decisive outer housing projects leading from the 
early 30’s well into the 70’s. From this scope, one can more comprehensively appreciate 
the ambition and vast renovation to occur with the Grand Paris Express. In order to fully 
appreciate the scale and transformative history that is urban planning for Paris and its 
outer regions, its birth in the mid-nineteenth century must first be examined.  
 
 
 
Creating its Nucleas: Haussman’s Streets of Paris and Beyond 
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Evaluating the renovation of Paris under the Baron Haussman can be comprised 
into five primary components. Its streets, buildings and their aesthetic, parks and 
promenades, services, and money were all integral to the composition and dynamics of 
the modern city.57 One of the largest changes in its construction were the extension and 
relocation of Paris’ streets. Already in stages of planning and production before 
Haussman’s administration, the new streets of Paris were to be determined in location 
and direction with respect to their existence already as, “places to live and shop according 
to new standards of upper middle class affluence, as a kind of stage for elegant living.”58 
With this in mind, these streets also, “linked the central organs of administration and 
business…with the focal points of the city’s various quarters.”59 Under considerable 
foresight already, these streets proved themselves as the interconnectivity of all of Paris’ 
various quarters. With this as their mode apparatus, the streets of Paris brought to 
attention all of the dynamics of city life. However, with its need for growth, these streets 
also demarcated what had been old Paris.  
“The realization of these new streets cutting through old quarters involved 
extensive expropriation and demolition of private buildings. This crucial aspect 
could not be carried out without a plan of Paris drawn to the most exact scale. A 
Paris which had grown by gradual addition did not need and had not supplied 
such a plan.”60 (15) 
 
The new streets of Paris proved themselves as both symbols of a larger networked city, 
while also serving as reminders of a tinier intimate past. For their seemingly transit 
orientated purpose, streets are integral components of and identities to a city. One of 
France’s well known urban theorists and planners, Le Corbusier argues the new purposes 
of streets, “should be a masterpiece of civil engineering” and that the, “corridor-street’ 
should be tolerated no longer, for it poisons the houses that border it.”61 A forerunner of 
the Machine Age and progression of society into the 20th century, Le Corbusier’s view of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 See Saalman and his book, Haussmann: Paris Transformed. 
58 Ibid, 14. 
59 Ibid, 14. 
60 Ibid, 15. 
61 Legates, Stout .  
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the street arguably presents one of the deep problems Paris continually struggles with. In 
its growth, the streets were a catalyst for the expansion of not only central Paris but its 
outlying areas.  
 Evident nowadays, the streets and highways of modern day France sequester and 
cut the Île-de-France into sections. Nowhere is this more evident than in the 
Peériphérique ring road highway finished in 1978, a ring that essentially encloses the 
proper city of Paris from its outlying banlieues. 62 Traditionally, when one thinks of 
highways in particular, they shield more than they reveal. American historian and urban 
theorist Eric Avila argues in his book, Popular Culture in the Age of White Flight: Fear 
and Fantasy in Suburban Los Angeles, that the freeway is representative of an insular, 
sheltered existence for those who can afford mobility and movement with cars and a 
counterdefinition, an “emblem of destruction” for those who cannot afford such means of 
movement.63 This holds true not only for a city as decentralized and car-centric as Los 
Angeles but for the newly aggrandized city of Paris.  
 Enright agrees, arguing that while, “the ‘island of Paris’ consisting of its historic 
quarters is well imaged and known world-wide…there is a notable gap in thought and 
deficit of representations of Paris on an urban scale beyond its official city limits64” 
resulting in a sheltered, obsolete view from the true representation of the Île-de-France 
region. Thinking concretely about the physicality of a ringed highway marking Paris 
from its banlieues accentuates the calculated efforts to maintain and safeguard the 
identity of Paris. The movement into the city of Paris created a need for improved 
mobility itself in the city, as exemplified by Haussman’s extension and expansion of 
streets. Yet streets have also proved themselves to be mobile blockades in for different 
users. In considering the importance of Haussman’s calculated scaling of Paris, a telling 
factor is the streets and what they signified for Parisiens. No longer able to create the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Hall, 79.  
63 Avila, 206.  
64 Enright, 73.  
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protected Gallic walls of the 15th and 16th century, the city has enclosed itself with its 
mobile “red-belt” ring on its outskirts. 
 Returning back to Haussman aesthetics, the buildings, parks and promenades, and 
services implemented during Paris’s mid-nineteenth century were a combined rectifying 
of small-scale complexity into monumental simplicity.65  Tantamount to their 
implementation was the thought and consideration into having something of aesthetic 
value remaining to the old city.  
  
Figure 1: The newly expanded streets of Haussman's Paris, 190066 
 
While Haussman was not influenced by the idea of the “positive effects” of park 
development, he did believe that fresh air, illumination, and green areas served a healthy 
purpose for the well being of the cities residents.67 Conversely, Haussman elevated the 
health and sanitation levels of Paris in his attention and demands for adequate sanitation 
and fresh water. Under his standardization, Paris received more than double its freshwater 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Saalman, 17.  
66 Haussman, depiction of Paris, 1900. Image from: http://www.intellego.fr/soutien-scolaire-
terminale-professionnelle/aide-scolaire-arts-appliques/urbanisme-2-haussmann-paris-1860-
1870/26896.  
67 Saalman, 19. 
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and a network of drainage and sewage systems were implemented68. Making Paris not 
only aesthetically appealing but also functional and sanitary vastly amplified not only its 
appeal but also its sustainability. In this transition shifting Paris from a densely packed 
neomedieval city into a prosperous and beautiful metropolis, Paris had established itself 
as the city of the 20th century, a city of grandeur and beauty that would be forever 
recognized as the prosperous, balanced city of modernity and timeless appeal. Ceding to 
change, as is difficult in many of the embedded ideologies of the French state, would 
prove to be difficult as Paris realized that its growth was not stagnating, but escalating.  
 
 
Crowding in: Expanding Outwards to Let People In 	  
 
 A key facet of urban planning underway for France at the end of the nineteenth 
century was both its decentralization and attention to multiple organized administrative 
powers in its urban planning. The division of power for these administrations created an 
aggrandized Île-de-France region, split up into fractioned areas of regions, departments, 
and municipalities. Struggling for more representation, the decentralization of Paris to 
regions has been acknowledged by scholars as a form of democratic success for its 
citizens.69 Division of power is important for more fair and equal representation. 
However, in the history of urban planning following Baron Haussman’s renovation, the 
process of development was laden with difficult obstacles for Paris’s urban planners. As 
evidenced in all newly industrialized cities, overcrowding, and inadequate housing were 
primary problems for all most all industrialized cities. The creation of “new towns” as 
coined by scholar James M. Rubenstein are the direct result of the growth-inducing 
industries provided by cities such as Paris.70 However, for all of their deliberate planning 	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69 Newsome, 185.  
70 Rubenstein, 5.  
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the new towns were disproportionately inadequate. Scholar Sophie Gonick argues that 
prior to the establishment of the new towns, the urban poor lived in impoverished, 
informal housing outside the city center. Known as bidonvilles, translating roughly to 
shantytowns, the postwar development did not correctly estimate the number of 
incomers.71 Furthermore, in their disorganized and simplistic planning immigrants living 
in these housing structures them were already segregated from the process of 
administrative, regional, urban planning.  
 Important to note also is the association of Paris’s expanded housing with 
immigrants. With the construction of the “new towns” came the placement of immigrants 
within them. Between 1946 and 1975, according to Newsome, the number of immigrants 
in France increased from 1,700,000 to 3,400,000.72 This drastic increase in immigrant 
population simultaneously separated and categorized those living in the outlying sectors 
of Paris as an “other”. Following this separation, actual placements for housing 
developed in a highly segregated manner. Many new young North-African men were 
isolated in dormitory-style buildings constructed and managed by the Société nationale 
de construction de logements pour les travailleurs (SONACOTRA).73 By placing them in 
unmixed housing, an unfortunate combination of economic disadavantage and 
marginalization soon followed. As a counterbalance to the poor planning following 
postwar France, the state put forth a plan to create public housing estates, known as 
Habitation a Loyer Modéré (HLMS). By the early 1970’s, 195 planned housing estates 
were constructed around Paris.74 Here their famed and notorious name, les banlieues 
created a societal connotation riff with poverty, immigration and foremost a 
disassociation with the central metropole of Paris. In their continued administrative and 
changing taxation policies, segregation and inequality immersed within the banlieues 
themselves. Evidence of gentrification occurred in the late 1970’s when the French 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 See Gonick, (2011). 
72 Newsome, 185. 
73 Newsome, 186. 
74Gonick, 30.  
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government created policies that incited home ownership among lower middle classes.75 
As discrimination is a substantive experience for many of les banlieues inhabitants, this 
encouragement for ownership pushed out those able to afford other housing over to those 
who had no other choice. The policies then created a cyclical problem of disadvantaged 
people occupying les banlieues, and as was often the case, they were immigrants. 
Ultimately, the policies incited by regional officials did little in helping to improve the 
livelihoods of those living the banlieues. Their policies encouraged those who could to 
leave and those who could not to stay.  
 In a seemingly proletariat struggle, instances of protest did occur for those living 
in the banlieues. Newsome reports that immigrants periodically speak against the 
debilitating policies put in place in their housing units. He writes,  
“In January 1975, for example, Algerian, Malian, and Senegalese residents of a 
SONACOTRA foyer in the Paris suburb of Saint-Denis initiated a rent strike to 
protest a 30 percent rent hike and the discriminatory conditions.”76   
 
Their protesting demonstrates a battle for the ability to shape the communities in which 
they live. In multiple respects, planning for the housing units outside of Paris left many 
gaping holes for the immigrants entering into the units. Foresight and planning was not 
conducted in a Haussmann manner, but rather an extrapolated and hurried plan executed 
without the thoughts of the dynamics of what an extension of Paris should be.  
 Contextualizing two different eras of urban planning –Haussmann’s Paris and 
later government extended housing for the masses requires some extra depth and 
exploration. Moving into the ideas and policies invested into urban planning in the late 
50’s up to the 70’s, three central figures were at hand for the new folds of Paris’s suburbs, 
Le Corbusier, Paul Delouvrier and Georges Pompidou. From their strategic planning, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Ibid, 30.  
76 Newsome, Brian. 187. Note: The SONACOTRA housing plan between 1965 and 1976 was 
administered by the interior prime minister in relation to the Algerian civil war occurring at the 
time. For a more in-depth and historical analysis see, Bernardot (1997) who discusses in detail the 
political aspects of the housing decisions during this period. For my purposes, I am sharing this to 
allude to the occurrence of segregated housing. However in my broader analysis, I want to 
separate this plan out from other French urban planning.  
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future of Parisian space was tightly gridlocked out to create massive housing for the high 
numbers of people moving into the region.  
 Le Corbusier, one of the world’s most influential and prominent architects and 
urban planners of the 20th century, revolutionized how urban planning organized and 
constructed cities. He, alongside other famous architects Ebenezer Howard and Frank 
Lloyd Wright were a new generation of urban thinkers, envisioning cities that were 
demographically diverse and that brought people together. In his designs and mapping of 
the city, Le Corbusier sought to prove that urban design was rational and promoted social 
welfare for the city’s residents.77 Intent on complimenting his buildings as lively spaces 
for inhabitants, Le Corbusier considered the needs and planning required for urban life.  
To many Parisian city planners and architects, Le Corbusier’s concepts of a city were 
vastly unorthodox and disjointed to the classic ideals of apartments and buildings in Paris. 
In 1925 at the Exposition International des Arts Décoratifs et Industriels Modernes, he 
received mixed reception after the unveiling of his Pavillon de l’Esprit Nouveau. Called a 
“beacon of radicalism,” his contemporary building presented one of the model housing 
cells for construction of his blocks of apartments.78 Perhaps most shocking and uncanny 
about this building, was its stark contrast to the grandeur and elaborate Haussman 
buildings tucked into Paris’s beautiful primary arrondisements. Reflecting on his 
Pavillon’s reception, Le Corbursier wryly noted,  
“The pavillon was ready in 1922, but the outside was shocking and naturally 
everybody screamed at the outside without bothering to see what was inside” (Le 
Corbursier from Le Corbursier Le Grand 153).  
 
His use of straight lines, flat concrete surfaces and blocked, gridded and taller housing 
was an illustrious metaphor to the post-industrial machine age, where height and 
symmetry were hailed as the future of buildings.  
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 Farther down in his career, Le Corbursier founded a collective of architects and 
engineers, the Assemblée de Constructeurs pour une Rénovation Architecturale, 
(ASCORAL), in the postwar period for reconstructing France’s cities. Combining his 
urban and domestic theories, Le Corbursier envisioned apartment blocks centered around 
a community with public and individual space: shops, schools, gymnasiums in each block, 
with the private homes overseeing the apartment blocks. For these apartments, Le 
Corbursier strongly took into consideration the importance of them remaining spaces for 
living. His imagined, Ville Radieuese, or Radiant City, incorporated the natural openness 
of areas in nature combining habitation with, “space, sun, and greenery”.79 Called “free-
form ribbon developments”80 housing blocks opened up to create breathing room and 
separation from industry and work with home life. While initially designed to release the 
constrictive environment of the city, these blocks of apartments became constrictive by 
their own accord. The distance from the city, difference in architecture, and their overall 
appearance created an environment that was both alien and unlike the commonly 
perceived city.  
  
Figure 1: Housing Unit from Le Corbursier, 194581 	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81 Image taken from http://obleo.net/tag/grasshopper/.  
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In this juxtaposed presentation, Parisians were adverse to the idea of living there and 
newcomers were left with no other choice. Describing one of his units in Marseille, he 
states:  
“The park has an imperial splendor. And the humans live in it as in a mirage. The 
silence is total. Yesterday the elevators took 500 guests 56 meters up in 13 
minutes. The indoor streets are an invitation to the life of the future. The kids 
have already got the message of this future life given over to gaiety and warm-
heartedness” (Le Corbursier, from Le Corbursier 424.)  
 
The importance of space, places for recreation, and a thriving community were at the 
forefront of Le Corbursier’s ideas. Spaces created for an engaged community was 
integral to his planning, yet there was something starkly disconnected about Le 
Corbursier’s blocked housing to the rest of the established city. Inlaid in the planned 
framework were unassailable differences to what was established in the past.  
 A forward thinker, his planning undertook a grounding realization that the world’s 
cities had to separate from past conceptions. With mass migration to cities, its 
construction could not evolve organically, but in a technical, outlaid manner. This 
measure of accountability and formulation to urban planning emphasized an applied 
scientific approach82. Unlike Haussman’s approach, Le Corbursier’s ideals took on 
Fordist overtones in his processed, supply and demand theory. Yet despite all of his 
appreciation for order and harmony, accommodating the movements inward to the city, 
the question then arises, how did planning from his Grands Projets unravel to such a state 
of disparity and isolation for residents living in the outer banlieues of Paris?  
 New, individualized, and unlike the tight-webbed city of Paris, Le Corbursier’s 
architectural plans spanned beyond just a difference in space and construction but an 
ingrained ideology of the city. With the movement into the 20th century, he stated, “These 
studies rest on an inalienable, unquestionable truth that is fundamental to all plans for 
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social organization: individual liberty.”83 The long debated question of the individual and 
his place in society has always been at the forefront of philosophical, political, and social 
debate for the French Republic. The government’s role -- in the mentality of the French 
state, is that of the protector.  Deciders of what is best for the individual, the government 
is centralized as the law and policy maker for the societal welfare of everyone. In this 
aspect, Le Corbursier’s planning for an environment enabling  individual freedom, 
contrasts to the French notion of a centralized, protective, city, embodied in the state’s 
capitol, Paris, and its ideologies.  
 
Theories for Creating Space: The Sociology of Space and Identity in the Region 
 
Another leading man who expanded and debated the ideas around the structuring 
of a city was Henri Lefebvre. A Marxist philosopher and sociologist, his arguments 
brought in not only the infrastructure needed to create a dynamic city, but also its 
sociological dynamics, who lives where, and how there is an intrinsic tie of politics and 
social life that cannot be separated from the methodical, technical approach to city 
planning.84 Contesting what he deemed a “scientific” and “empirical” approach to town 
planning, Lefebvre sought to weave together the technical process with the societal 
realities that make up a city. “Space is political” Lefebvre asserts and to separate the two 
ideologies is detrimental to an adequate planning process. 85  
 As a member of the French Communist Party, Lefebvre’s ideas were radically 
different from those of the centralized, authoritarian French state. In his Reflections on 
the Politics of Space, he argues that urban planning has three dimensions: production, 
financial, and spatio-temporal. For the purposes of exploring the relationship between the 
suburbs of Paris and Paris central, his third dimension, the spatio-temporal, is critical to 
developing a sound and fair understanding of the suburbs and their obvious disconnect to 	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the city. For the former two, production and financial planning of the new towns and 
suburbs were well-connected, stemming from the work of architects and city planners of 
Paris. Yet, for the third component, Lefebvre argues that it has yet to be integrally 
connected to production and financial planning because it holds a specific relationship to 
the specific space itself and its innate networks of communication and transactions, for 
our case, the outlying new housing units of greater Paris. In this sense, there exists a well-
structured, formulated infrastructural planning to these new developments. 86 But to this 
point no clear social or spatial networks of management had existed as of yet. Following 
this thread, the development of Paris’s new departments was not well coordinated 
between those who were going to live there, and those who were planning who was going 
to live there.  
 What Lefebvre observed, which other city planners and architects missed, is 
perhaps the core problem of the outer suburbs, both at their construction and during 
periods of civil unrest and rioting. Lefebvre picked up on the vital and major utilization 
of networks in the spatio-temporal facet of a city.87 If construction, financing, and 
production beget the actual space, subsequently the people who follow to live in it have 
not yet created sound and clear forms of networks, be they through communication, 
commerce, or transportation. Consequently, for the Île-de-France, Paris was already 
tightly webbed and packed as a network, but the developing areas, due to their newness 
and flux of inhabitants from all over France and countries abroad, developed a web of 
networks that were tenuous at best.  
 Lefebrve succinctly summarizes, “Urban space becomes the place of encountering 
new things, people – an exchange.”88 Predicting well in advance the current concepts of 
social capitol and the high importance of networks, Lefebrve developed theories that can 
be applied to Paris’s current problem of urbanization and sociological disconnect of its 	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residents. These housing unites and their newness to the already established city of Paris 
created a dynamic that was difficult to discern at first as just developing or disjointed. Yet 
in ignoring the growing inequalities developing socially for these residents, planners of 
French urban policy were not aware of the need for networks and a social connection.  
 
Keys to the City: To Contract or Create 
 
 Herein it is apparent that the Île-de-France – and all of France’s cities, were 
caught in the crossroads of an inevitable progression into city expansion and development 
while holding onto the ideals of the well-established beauty and protection of a traditional 
city. This desire for living within the city and not in its outlying quarters and banlieues 
intensified the separation of borders in and around the Île-de-France region. It was in 
1960 when Paul Delourvier was appointed by then President Charles de Gaulle to further 
develop the areas into livable and functioning departments. Heralded as the father of the 
French new towns, Paul Delourvier was ambitious in his efforts to move away from the 
isolation of apartment blocks and grands ensembles towards a more holistic community. 
In an interview, Delouvrier describes how city expansion was based decidedly upon two 
factors: continuous development and isolated points of growth.89 Continuous 
development was unfavorable because in French opinion it would create, “tache d’huile” 
or, in other terms, sprawl. Isolating growth also proved to be difficult because it would 
require, according to Delourvier, “a sharper discipline or control than the French people 
would accept.”90 Thus, continuous growth along direct axes and lines with the new towns 
as focal points would provide the services and a livelihood for urban life otherwise found 
in the center of Paris.91 Also a matter at hand was the implications of naming these areas 
as ‘new towns.’ For Delouvrier it was a struggle:  
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“If it were said that new suburbs were being built in the Paris region no one 
would have said a thing; but the term ‘new towns’ is a pretension, a method of 
organizing true growth. Everyone in the provinces and even in the government 
was going to take this as a desire to the Paris region grow”92 
 
Thematically throughout Paris’s rapid expansion in the 20th century is an overarching 
tone of resistance to real and open settlement in the Paris region. Despite his concerns for 
creating lively and functioning towns, Delouvrier was engaged in a deeper campaign with 
those already living in the Paris region.   
 Before the new towns finalized plans in 1965, planning for the Île-de-France 
region was primarily run by the national agency, Délégation à l’Aménagement du 
Territoire et à l’Action Régionale (DATAR).93 Under their assessment, urbanization in 
Paris was discouraged because of the dearth of land on which to build. The extreme 
pressure to inhabit Paris was a phenomenon that is still evident today. Its role as the 
nation’s capitol and large hub of economic wealth creates an interesting juxtaposition to 
the undesirability of locating business, homes, and commerce to its outlying departments. 
For Delouvrier, assessing the nature of this problem was to expand urbanization hubs 
elsewhere so that the Parisian agglomeration could breathe. The dynamic interplay of 
urbanizing in new space would then give Delouvrier’s towns every opportunity for 
successful development both at the economic level and that of environmental 
protection.94 Centered around the principle of urbanizing poles, growth could occur and 
structure the outskirts of the Île-de-France. After meticulous planning, this is how five 
new towns were born: Cergy-Pontoise, Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, Evry, Melun-Sénart, 
and Marne-la-Vallée.95 After his legacy, the visions of Paul Delouvrier encapsulated 
crucial aspects of urban planning that acknowledged the inevitable blockage of 
movement into Paris directly, while encouraging outside growth for independent 
economies and residences.  	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 Perhaps what was most distinct about moving into the Île-de-France region was 
the sense of permanence felt in constructing these social housing neighborhoods and new 
towns. Prior to the age of what French scholars Jobert and Théret have dubbed, 
“neoliberalism à la Française”96, Paris was regarded as a singular vision of beauty and  
unique arrangement. It was a city foreigners and tourists could admire and visit from all 
over. Yet leading up to WW II it was just that: a place to visit. Following the postwar 
construction of social housing neighborhoods and new towns was not just a physical 
change to its urban landscape but also a change to its overall identity as a city. By the 
1980’s France altered many of its laws and policies on immigration under socialist 
President François Mitterand. Mustafa Dikeç, a scholar and professor of urban planning 
and human geography, observes this shift in policy coinciding with a paramount moment 
of civil unrest and disruption in the banlieues of Paris and other French cities. Brought to 
attention by media, the looting and unrest pre-dawned the violence and chaos that 
occurred in 2005. 
  Suddenly brought to the forefront of political attention, the banlieues came to the 
forefront of political and social attention. For Dikeç, French urban policy in the 1980’s 
and 1990’s centered itself around the problems specifically associated with the banlieues, 
their economic disparity and the large numbers of immigrants living there.97 Yet at a loss 
for how to adjust their urban policy in adaptive social terms, French Urban Policy took 
on a renewed vigor in creating policies centered around ideas of “financial solidarity”98 
namely, fostering economic activity and to increase employment through tax concessions 
in specific areas of Paris’s neighborhoods. As solving most housing and inequality 
problems, concessions made out through social welfare from the state has occurred since 
the Île-de-France had housing. However, what has elapsed is not always successful. The 
idea of “mixed housing” has undergone various forms of implementation since Paris 	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began expanding. Coined under the term, Habitation Loyer Modérée or HLMs were 
developed both in and outside the greater Paris area to provide low-income housing. 
However, the HLM buildings in central Paris were much more expensive than those on 
the outlying periphery because of differences in land costs. Incidentally, HLM 
developments constituted as requiring higher financial support are more concentrated in 
the suburbs of Paris.99 Additionally, there is an even lesser degree of HLM developments 
in the peripheral new town areas of the Île-de-France region.100 Thus, a process of 
economic gentrification has backfired in a sense, where the HLM developments, aimed to 
help those who were economically disadvantaged, have only further isolated contained 
suburbs of lower social classes. Dikeç argues further that in responding to the civil unrest 
that occurred in these concentrated areas, the French state has taken on “authoritarian 
role,” utilizing its powers as protector of the state to justify its policies against the 
“menaces to the republic.”101 Politically, the agenda set forth by French politicians of the 
1980’s and 90’s has reformatted the problems of the banlieues to be in and of themselves 
the problem. Marked as “neighborhoods in difficulty”102 little has been done to help them 
socially. Under penalizing urban policy, the banlieues have undergone a long duration of 
embedded social stigmitization, and polarization.  
 To some degree, one can imagine and hope that the new towns would have helped 
absolve and satisfy many of the problems presented by the apparent isolation and void of 
viable economies for people on the outer districts of the Île-de-France. Yet in current 
assessment by scholars, planning for the greater Paris area and its banlieues was only 
destined to degrees de mal en pis. For surveyors of the current state of the banlieues, 
Sophie Gonick writes, “encouraged by a discourse that draws upon the Republicanism of 
the French state, these areas have become synonymous with a kind of dangerous urban 
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pathology.”103 Caught in the balance between restrained growth and massive development, 
the French state faced difficult decisions in imposing effective policies. By mere 
association with the number of people moving into the Île-de-France region, construction 
of housing developments and new towns took on negative connotations. Tainted by the 
marked separation from Paris, it is now near impossible to identify the banlieues as a part 
of Paris. They are represented distinctly distant, one apart from the other.  
 What is important to ask now is how the problems within the banlieues are being 
addressed. What are the political, social, and cultural narratives at hand? Is the French 
state adopting policy measures that are only continuations of repressive, penal policies? 
Or is there a new agenda being laid out? And more importantly, who exactly is laying out 
the agenda?  
 In the following chapter I will examine in detail the exact connotations of the 
banlieues leading up to the rioting of 2005, what preceded afterwards, and how the 
banlieues are currently being presented. From this I hope to investigate their real 
differences, not only in economic terms but also in social and cultural terms. For it cannot 
be denied that despite the values upheld by the French Republic of liberté, égalité, and 
fraternité, there exists a tangible sense of the other, as spatially presented through Paris, 
and its outlying suburbs.  
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Chapter Three: Vying Voices for Change  
 For the residents in the banlieues, it is often just their portrayal and a 
characterization of their plight as described by French press and media. Hearing their 
actual accounts gives the realities of their situation. Recent testimony from banlieue 
residents makes it hard to believe housing renovations have actually been implemented.  
“It’s difficult to live here, the buildings are badly built, the situation with housing 
is a total mess. The main problems are housing, finding work, and then making it 
to the end of the month. Once we’ve paid the electricity and water bills, we find 
we don’t have much money left”104 
 
 explained high-school student Danaé in an interview.  Clichy-Sous-Bois, where she lives, 
is notoriously known as a bad neighborhood and was where the rioting of 2005 began. 
According to Danaé and other residents, the living conditions of Parisian banlieues have 
remained unfavorable places to live. Debated and discussed over in the most recent 
elections, the issue is called, Le Problèmes Banlieues.105 Socialist candidate, Françoise 
Hollande spoke out against the stark inequalities present and the need for direct, 
immediate change. Nicolas Sarkozy, who was president and member of moderate right 
party the UMP, defended his past housing policies to create change and spoke of an 
advancement occurring for many areas in and around the Île-de-France region.  
 Supporters of the far right party, Le Front National, favored Marine Le Pen’s 
staunch position against the problems of the banlieues. The party’s platform heavily 
situated and connected banlieue strife to statewide concerns about economic insecurity, 
immigrants, and unemployment.106 As polling results showed, despite socialist president 
Françoise Hollande’s win for the presidency, polling for support of the National Front 
found an all time high --17.9% of the vote, for Marine Le Pen in the 2012 election than in 
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previous years.107 Puzzled by the numbers, analysts categorized this voting behavior as 
the “normalizing”108 of far right politics. Put in other words, anti-immigrant discourse is 
becoming more and more acceptable in France. According to Nilufer Gole, professor of 
sociology at Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Science Sociales in Paris, increased voting for 
National Front candidate Marine Le Pen presents that, “there is no shame in voting for a 
person who represents the feelings and anxieties of the people, and who is, ‘one of us.”109 
In a way, voters found consolation in Marine Le Pen’s animosity towards the banlieues. 
She made it easy to argue that these neighborhoods themselves created their problems, 
and that the rest of France should not be responsible.  
 Succeeding the Sarkozian years where sociopolitical discourse further ostracized 
the outer communes of France, there is a continued tendency to impress France’s 
statewide concerns on the banlieues.  The past elections have made it clear how 
problematically all these issues are placed one on top of the other. France’s economic 
decline, high unemployment, housing strains, and anti-immigration measures are 
synonymously placed alongside the problems of the banlieues.  
 Yet these higher voting percentages of the far right and shared “feelings and 
anxieties of the people” does not present just one dynamic of the political climate in the 
Île-de-France region. The mounting support for political parties such as the National 
Front brings to focus two important facets of the 2012 French presidential campaign: a 
growing characterization of the banlieues as places occupied by immigrants and the 
unemployed but also a growing political voice from residents in the banlieues themselves. 
It can be argued that the heightened radicalization of the far right party suggests an 
amplification of not one, but two minority groups.  
 For these banlieuesards, as they are called by the press, it is difficult to determine 
where they place themselves in the political process. For, as one youth from Clichy-Sous-	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Bois reported, “I voted in the elections. But whether I voted or not, it does not make 
much difference.”110 His désespoir in the French political system is a despair shared by 
many from low-income communes in the Île-de-France. The recent elections have 
presented additional complexities to an already muddled social issue. Struck now by 
demonizing characterizations from far right political figures but also with a political 
voice of their own, residents of the banlieues are in a political warfare of sorts. Their 
demands are equal job opportunities, voting rights, and better housing accommodations. 
Yet they are also working to de-politicize their stigmatization as France’s grand ensemble.  
 For this chapter, in moving away from the actual construction of and policies for 
the banlieues, I plan to examine the ways in which the banlieues and cités of the Île-de-
France have been socially drawn, both by central political figures, and by those living in 
them. First I will draw upon various discourses around the rioting preceding, during, and 
following the events of 2005. The variety of problems presented as the root of the rioting 
suggests that there is no singular dimension for a solution. Rather, a continued 
progression towards more effective policies, social mobilization and transferred ideas 
creates an oscillation of new ideologies. These ideologies however, are not merely 
reproduced gestations of past behavior in the banlieues. I argue there is a new order and 
sense of direction. Where there was once only désespoir, I plan to show from a variety of 
past and current discourses, hope is now impressed on the minds of les banlieuesards.  
 A strong facet that continually comes up their presentation of the banlieues. As 
depicted in the film, La Haine, by Mathieu Kassovitz, young men roam their destitute 
neighborhoods and the streets of Paris, hoping to find some semblance of belonging, yet 
always seeming to find contentious quarrels and struggles in both places. In his 
commentary on the creation of the film, director Mathieu Kassovitz writes about the 
reality of people’s living situations in the banlieues.  There is an attirance of sorts 
towards delinquency, violence, and drug trading that occurs within these neighborhoods, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 See Lantier.  
	  	  
48	  
which gives them such a bad rap. At the head of this derogatory escapade was President 
Nicolas Sarkozy. Kassovitz argues that through men like Sarkozy, their words and 
descriptions, incurs “hate upon hate,” which then develops and devolves into stereotypes 
and an entrenched imprisonment of people’s existence in these areas.111 Like many zoned 
districts in large metropolises, there are certain ones with highly devolved stories, which 
stick and remain to their foundations.  
 
Le Mal Nommé: Cité, Banlieue, Zone Urbaine, et Les Grands Ensembles 
 
 Before continuing into the events that have circulated around and embedded 
themselves into the framework of the suburbs outside of Paris, it is important to note 
exactly what the terms banlieues and cités actually denote. As categorizations of areas, 
banlieue translates as the suburbs in the English language, but it carries a negative 
connotation in its French meaning. In French, banlieue translates to ‘banned location.’ In 
the Middle Ages, these banned locations were localities under control by officials of the 
main town. Inhabitants of the banned locations did not have the same rights and freedoms 
as the authorities in the area. Today the French use multiple terms to describe the 
neighborhoods outside of France, yet there are associations and subtle differences for 
each word used. For example, another term for banlieue is cité,  which specifically 
signifies the housing estates developed by Delouvrier and other city planners in the 1950s, 
1960s and 1970s112. After eventual stalemates of growth in the late 1970s, specific cités in 
the Île-de-France began to develop stronger negative associations than others. La 
Courneuve, the 93rd commune in the Île-de-France, is distinctly a space of social 
inequality with high levels of youth unemployment113.  It has historically been this way 
for some time, creating an impression of permanence to its socio-economic class. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 See Kassovitz’s positioning on the banlieues in “La France d’en Bas”  
112 See Waddington, King, Jobard.  
113 INSEE. La Courneuve (93027 – Commune) Emploi – Population active. See Figures in 
Appendix D. 
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French have many different iterations and ways to describe the space they inhabit. The 
name La Courneuve alone stands isolated from the rest of the regions departments.  
 Despite their low-income portrayal, not all communes within the Île-de-France 
are economically worse off than the central part of the city. In fact, many departments in 
the western region are valued as booming centers of commerce and industry for the 
French state.  They are well off economically and attract many nodes of industry such as 
engineering, green energy, and biotechnology.114 Yet the wealth does not evenly circulate 
around the Île-de-France. Concentrated in its western half, the departments have been 
split into the haves and the have nots. In French city planning terms, the name Zones 
cropped up as a way to differentiate between the various communes and their relative 
prosperity. The three classifications, Zone d’Education Prioritaire,(ZEPs)  Zone franches 
urbaines, (ZFU) and Zone Urbaines Sensibles (ZUS) are all designations of communes 
and their relative need for ‘urban policy recovery’. They are all given a form of social 
welfare allocations from the state. Zones for education (ZEPs), tax and duty free areas 
(ZFUs), and economic statistics (ZUS), are all titles for subsidies from the state. Yet by 
doing so, the communes have been polarized as spaces social and economic needs. They 
are then endowed with a dependency to the state, who regulates and oversees provisional 
and policy aid for these communes. Moreover, aside from policy terms, they also hold the 
negative connotations associated with the banlieue.115  For a variety of reasons these have 
become the associations of the various cités. Evolving from a confluence of social and 
policy ideations is an inextricable tie to the terms given to the cités and banlieues.  
Handicapped by social deprecation while also aided through taxation cuts and economic 
resources, the meanings behind the words banlieue, and cité, carry the weight of a 
difficult and severe place to live.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Cadenel, Nicole and Christian Calzada. In their findings, the de-industrialization of the Île-de-
France has resulted in considerable growth for technology and research in some areas, such as la 
Dèfense, Saclay and Palaiseau. 28.  
 
115 Waddington, King, Jobard, Xx.  
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Recognition and Denial: Two Addresses from the State 
 
 Studying the actual movements within specific hard-hit banlieue localities reveals 
the extent of their proletariat identity and also their immigrant identity. As discussed 
earlier, outlying areas of France experienced moments of civil unrest and disruption 
before the rioting of 2005. Terms such as L’Été Chaud, to describe the summer events 
that occurred in the Minguettes housing in Lyon during 1981, indicate that residents were 
experiencing a sense of embottled emotions. Coinciding with these events was the policy 
framework, politique de la ville, ambitiously seeking to help deprived urban areas.116  Yet 
in already deprived states, the politique de la ville, despite its intentions for revitalization 
did not successfully help the residents of the Zones Urbaines Sensibles (ZUS). In the 
1980s two threads arose under congruent observance in the banlieues: a generation of 
sons from immigrant blue-collar families without jobs or a good education and an 
increase of demand in the heroin market.117 To follow were immediate allegations 
centered around youth delinquency, crime involvement and high dropout rates in school. 
All of this rhetoric was connected to the prevailing drug environment. Intensifying this 
culture were the paramilitary police unites deployed in the cités beginning in the 1990s. 
Thereby, advancing towards an idea of extreme surveillance and policing, the 
neighborhoods turned from economically disadvantaged to socially hostile, volatile to 
crime and corruption. As Waddington and Jodard summarize, the timelining of social and 
economic policies to help the residents has, in many respects, been, “extremely 
counterproductive.”118 It has also been extremely detrimental to the image of these cities. 
They are branded with an image of crime and unrest, making it difficult to avoid their 
negative associations.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Ibid, 31.  
117 Ibid, 33. 
118 Ibid, 37.  
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 Coming as no surprise, the case study findings from Waddington, Jodard and 
King, as well as other scholars, show a direct correlation where the rioting of 2005 
occurred were designated ZUS. However, contrary to the depictions presented by the 
media and press immediately following the riots, Waddington, Jodard and King noted 
that where rioting occurred was, “much more precisely correlated with the level of 
segregation of these people” in these neighborhoods designated as ZUS. 119 We can 
deduce that more concentrated segregation within the banlieues heightens and delineates 
the communes themselves. From this observation, there is not only differentiation from 
central Paris and wealthier communes in the Île-de-France but also each neighborhood in 
the departments themselves. The extent to these degrees of separation, made so finite, 
suggest that residents, specifically the unemployed youth, feel a complete and utter sense 
of abandoment. They have no sense of community or belonging in where they live. It is 
understandable then in what transpired during the rioting. The riots were a multitude of 
things, but above all there was an exceptional feeling of embottled despair and plight.  
 As I discussed in my opening chapter, the many interpretations and analyses that 
ensued after the riots were multifarious and at times contradictory. Debated through 
many lenses such as economic volatility, a policing problem, youth delinquency, and the 
threat of Islam, they have become compressed into an amalgamation of dilemmas that the 
French state is now treading delicately around. Yet it seems the state is unable –and 
moreover, unwilling to fully cede and fix the housing crisis and identifiable education 
gaps in the ZUS. Alain Morice, a scholar of French sociology, observed that many of the 
institutionalizing laws and policies laid out following the riots, eradicated the possibility 
for protesters to present their feelings in an open democratic dialogue. Furthermore, 
politicians presented two acted in two ways: severe punishment of the acts as vandalism 
and finding solutions for the problems in the quartiers difficiles.120  Yet dealing with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Ibid, 113.  
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banlieues has posed many problems. France acts a social-welfare state, but struggles to 
recognize the unequal benefits they enact. They give out social benefits, while also 
pointedly failing in their social welfare policies.  The French state was stuck grappling 
with their solutions in a way that would decidedly deal with the problem.  
 
 
The Banlieue Debate at Large 
 
 Also important to articulate is that for the first time in France, the problems of the 
banlieues was brought to the forefront of international attention. It moved beyond merely 
the French press. International media coverage displayed the burning cars, schools and 
public buildings for all to see. It was as if France’s heavily guarded and policed cités 
were suddenly unleashed out for the world to witness. No longer an underlying, 
peripheral  issue kept dissumulé by the French, residents of the banlieues made 
themselves visible beyond the surveillance of the French Republic. This is integral to 
understand for multiple reasons. First, in having not just national but international 
coverage of the riots, the French news dealt with not only addressing the manifestations 
of the rioting but also acknowledging the ways in which other media coverage was 
interpreting and covering the high levels of unrest and chaos. In one article from Le 
Monde titled, “Comment la droite américaine exploitait les émeutes” author Serge Halimi 
deplores the ways in which American media from the right, specifically Fox news, 
associates social agitation with sentiments against ‘enemies of the exterieur”.  He argued 
American discourse and media dissemination is ingrained in the voice of the right, and 
badly posed to answer the problems.121 It is notable that the rioting was debated through 
these two lenses. The American media presented it in many ways from their own 
interpretations of riots. However, the United State’s history of rioting holds different 
historical significance then that of the banlieue.  	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 Spun one way versus another, French journalists found themselves facing a story 
beyond their own framing. In another article, Alec G. Hargreaves interviewed youth in 
the communes of Seine-St-Denis. He noted an 18 year olds frustration with 
discrimination. The youth of the departments wish for insertion into French society, he 
discovered after hearing their complaints, were by means of employment.122 Construed 
and interpreted in various ways, news and media sought answers and justifications for 
reasons behind the riots. However, as many remark in their concluding sentences, the 
French state was too late in addressing the inequalities present in the banlieues. Beyond 
the state’s failure to understand what was boiling, there was also a failure to fully 
comprehend what was at stake for the youth engaged in the riots.  
 Weighing in on opinions from abroad, French headlines engaged with an 
international dialogue. Le Courrier International featured journalists from Europe and 
the United States, who compared and debated the ways in which the French state and 
other countries dealt with discrimination and rioting. Josep Playà Masset, writer for La 
Vanguardia expressed the dissimilarities between France and Spain in dealing with the 
two issues. He observed there is also a similar influx of recent immigration into Spain but 
that they run little risks of rioting.123 Washington Post journalist David Ignatiuas openly 
addressed France’s failure to adhere to a system of positive discrimination, stating, “the 
pretended egalitarian system does nothing but guarantee unequal results.124 Dagens 
Nyheter, writing from Stockholm, pointedly noted that the French state has an embedded 
history of colonization, and that their political elite strictly enforce the ‘valueurs de la 
République”. By contrast, Sweden does not have a history of colonization, alleviating 
many potential racial tensions.125  Contextualized historically, socially, and through 
French law, opinions from everywhere assessed the rioting. France was forced to also 
analyze them under new auspices it had been denying previously.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 See Hargreaves. Le Monde Diplomatique. November 2006.  
123 See Maset, Le Courrier International. “ 
124 See, Ignatius. 
125 SeeDagens Courrier International  
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 While news coverage of the events of the banlieues was debated and discussed, 
another topic came to the forefront of the French Press. Politicians and the news covered 
stories around a growing concept of Islamophobia in France. Presented as a fundamental 
inconsistency to French Society and Europe, articles ranged from opinion pieces by 
François Bayrou, a French centrist politician, to student led activism in newly “Islam 
infiltrated” neighborhoods. In an article published in France’s L’Express, writers Eric 
Conan and Christian Makarian report on the growth of an Islamic presence in France and 
Europe. Citing historical events and periods of Muslim and Judeo-Christian conflicts and 
battles, they argue that Islam is incompatible in Europe. They go on to extrapolate over 
Western stereotyped notions of Islam, such as the “renfermement endogamique des 
jeunes filles” (confinment and endogamous control of girls) or an , “evolution of Islam.” 
What’s more, they stress the strong aversion to multi-culturalism, which they claim is not 
always a richness to the region. He argues, “This awareness is due to immigrant activists 
who want to emancipate from a growing Muslim male chauvinism in Europe”126 I bring 
up this article to highlight how journalists from a French perspective perpetuate and 
clearly make apparent a deep-seated cultural difference in France.  That is, the 
unwillingness to accept a multi-culturalist ideology. The way Conan and Makarian 
interprete and portray the Islam Europe debate through their article is itself an acute 
measure of French ideology. By framing Islam as incompatible to France, they are only 
further propagating the resistance to it.  
 Perhaps made clearer, is the narrowing of Islamophobic feelings to specific 
campaigns in neighborhoods within Île-de-France. In an article from France’s Libération  
titled, “Traquenard au pinard contre l’Islam,” author Julia Pascual reports one young 
woman’s efforts to denounce and retaliate against the “islamisation” occurring in the 
Goutte-d’Or, her neighborhood in the 18th arrondisement of Paris. Self-described as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Conan, Eric. Christian Makarian. “Enquête su la montée de l’Islam en Europe” L’Express 
26/01/2006. Translation is my own.  
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“ultralaïques” to emphasis a strong adherence to the French laïcité law, Sylvie François, 
the leader behind the event, explains a need to prove the unease she feels living in her 
quarter and how those living there, “no longer feel at home in their neighborhood”. In her 
efforts to campaign against this ‘islamisation’ she hosted a gathering for pork appetizers, 
in an outright effort to “re-conquer their territory and identity.”127 This counterattack 
against Islamic practices over actual spatial territories denotes a peculiar French cultural 
dominance. Made apparent from this campaign is the threat French citizens feel in their 
neighborhood from Islamic religious observance. Pinned to a simple choice of food, this 
campaign gets at an even more deeply seated cultural difference.  François’ decision to 
campaign a French social, and –as made evident, cultural practice, against a religious 
practice demonstrates the obtuse incomprehensible threat she feels. The debate pits 
cultural values against religious values and wants to prove the two are incompatible. 
There is a hot conteraction against differences in France, yet many are blinded to their 
own culturalist assumptions.  
 By this point in time, most of the heat from the rioting had ceded. However, the 
politicizing of the riots as acts of fundamental Islam pervaded into the political discourse 
at large. The delinquent youth rebellion story had morphed and attached itself to debates 
about immigrant occupation and moreover, Islamic occupation in France. In comparison 
to other European countries, France holds a high immigrant percentage.128 Yet there was 
still a strong emergence of resistant ideology to Islam in France after the rioting of 2005.  
 There was little France could do to prevent the swift media reception immediately 
following the riots. Media engagement from both sides, audiences from all over chimed 
in their opinions. Left wing, Right wing, and from minorities, citizens in the Île-de-
France concurrently began to use their political voices. After the rapid ascension of the 
Internet and social media in the new digital age, forums blossomed on blogs, groups 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 See Pascual. “Traquenard au pinard contre l’islam” Libération.  
128 Conan, Eric and Christian Makarian.   
	  	  
56	  
formed under collective, social engagement, and opinions began to spread at 
unprecedented scale. Whereas in previous years where Paris’s center could quell and 
ignore the civil unrest after several weeks passed, the emergence of networking and 
global social discourse set off a continuous pulse. Those in the center now heard 
periphery voices that had previously been silenced.  
 
 
Chapter Four: Engaging in the Dialogue  
Avenues for Political and Social Change in the Île-de-France 
 To open up this chapter, I move away from discussions and narration on the riots 
of 2005, towards the current discourse in the Île-de-France. I decided to reach out and 
speak with various organizations on issues addressing sociopolitical and socio-spatial 
injustices in France. As an American reaching out to multiple groups, I prefaced my 
requests for interviews based on my interest in both the social and the spatial dynamics of 
the Île-de-France.  
Before elaborating on the interviews conducted, I want to highlight first the ones I 
was not successful with. I received more reception from non-government affiliated 
organizations than actual French administrative offices. A variety of factors I think are 
connected to this illuminating facet. Primarily, being government branches, I found it was 
difficult to navigate and speak to an associate who would pass on information related to 
their operations. Whether it was because they did not have the time or if they could not 
disclose information, I continually came to blockades and forwarded dropped calls. 
Additionally, I observed a resistant tone to the administrative representatives I spoke with. 
The majority of them advised me to acquire the information through their website, and 
others would just hang up. One such organization was the Société du Grand Paris. In my 
efforts to speak to their press relations, I was redirected and given e-mail addresses to 
contact.  
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However, I want to emphasize here that my position as an American social-
science academic plays as much a part of my efforts to gather information, as it does to 
these organizations sharing it. This can be attributed to my accent, but also a certain 
French institutional opposition to disclosing information. As a governing body, their 
processes should not be questioned. I make this distinction from my comparable 
experience and classes on French society while abroad. As a foreigner to France, my 
curiosity raised speculation before compliance. But for the organizations I did speak with 
I discovered illustrative and signifying reports.  
My first interview was with Marwan Abu Dijibril Muhammed, a representative 
for the organization, Collection Contre l’Islamophobie en France. Beginning in 2003, the 
collective was founded to help and support the victims of discrimination and hate crimes 
based on Islamophobic prejudice. Growing in France at that time was the idea of 
Islamophobia. Marwan explained to me that many French political figures were making 
very bold declarative statements against Islam. Furthermore, they were not ashamed of 
their Islamophobic sentiments. In addition to the oppressive speech, the collective formed 
in a parallel moment to France’s law forbidding the wearing of the foulard129. What 
followed was an increase in incidents of Islamophobic hate crimes and prejudices in the 
streets of France. Providing psychological and legal support, CCIF helps victims of 
Islamic prejudice cope with the derogatory and hurtful speech and acts directed towards 
them.  In addition, their legal counsel empowers people to be aware of unlawful prejudice 
and bias they may experience in administrative, public, and private spaces.130  
 Marwan explained to me that the CCIF is not a religious organization but a civil 
organization, engaging with people from a variety of diverse backgrounds. A part of his 
role helps, “take part in the anti-roma prejudice and the anti-semitism” however, their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 The foulard is French for scarf or neckerchief. I use it colloquially here to present how it is 
discussed in modern French conversation. However, other words exist to describe the adornment 
restricted in the 2004 law.   
130 Marwan Muhammed. Appendix A. Personal Interview. 
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campaign, is “specifically on Islamophobia individually.”131  While discussing with 
Marwan the numerous incidences of discrimination occurring in the Île-de-France region 
and France at large, Marwan repeatedly spoke about many of the conceptions centered 
around Islamophobia. In their case findings, the reports were almost always conceptions 
of appearance and physical determiners. Those who allegedly look Muslim, men from 
Seik religions, having beards, and darker skin color are all markers of an identity that is 
supposedly Islamic.132 Frequently women are targeted because they wear the hiijab, or 
headscarf. Quantifying the number of incidences, Marwan cited that a shocking 87% of 
the hate crimes reported are targeted at women.133 Additionally, after the 2004 law passed, 
discriminators will misinterpret it and band women from many public establishments in 
the region. Restaurants, administrative buildings, gyms, bakeries, cafés, and places of 
employment are all utilized as places of discrimination and subjugation. This suggests 
that there is a reoccurrence of discrimination occurring in novel “hot-spots” around the 
Île-de-France.  
 Singular isolated incidents acts are not sufficient enough to explain a rise of 
Islamophobia in France. Yet correspondingly, as anti-Islam ideology is disseminated, the 
CCIF has recorded an amplified number of reported cases. Citing their numbers, Marwan 
said 2012 was the highest year on record, with 369 incidents reported.134 However, he 
notes this report is most likely inaccurate because victims interiorize and do not realize 
that these acts of discrimination are, in fact, illegal. Marwan describes it as a rising 
phenomenon in France. It is visible that Islamophobia is no longer an isolated event, but 
rather an identifiable form of racism that pervades around French society. Recalling the 
far right rhetoric from earlier, the CCIF’s high reported numbers correlate well to the 
rising political allegiance of France’s far right party members. Islamophobia is not just a 
creation from everyday citizens, but dispelled down from minority political elites.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Muhammed. Appendix A.  
132 Cesari, 1. 
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 To fully understand the areas centered around Islamophobia in the Île-de-France 
region, I asked Marwan about localities and if distinctly segregated places still existed.  
As noted before by many scholars such as Waddington (2009), Cesari (2005), and 
Ossman (2006), the neighborhoods in the Île-de-France are not measured in terms of 
ethnicity or race but on income levels. However, Cesari’s discussions on the “subculture” 
in the banlieues of France is centered on conflated issues around poverty, ethnicity, and 
Islam.135  Discussing this concept Marwan noted,  
“Different from the U.S – here the idea of community, or a Muslim community, is 
relatively taboo. We don’t say that this is a Black neighborhood, or this is an Arab 
neighborhood or this is a White – or predominately White neighborhood. We 
don’t usually use this categorization in France. What we see, is that the religious 
belonging, or that the ethnic or cultural belonging of an individual has no 
statistical explanatory power”136  
 
Certainly there is no absolute explanatory power from one’s race or religious affiliation 
and economic income. However, important to note in these departments specifically 
located in the Île-de-France is Cesari’s continued “subculture” – a continued taboo, that 
the French state has embedded into its social ideology. There is a strict state ordinance to 
look at these neighborhoods in economic levels. However, apparent is a cultural 
permanence to associate Muslims, Arabs, and people of Islamic origin as coming from 
these departments and neighborhoods in France. Thus there is an existence of real 
barriers, both physical and conceptual, between people in the Île-de-France region. 
Accordingly, Marwan mentioned that there still is an over representation of North-
Africans and Arabs in deprived areas around Paris, namely the “91st, the 93rd, and the 94th 
arrondisements.137  These are the same places where the riots began seven years ago.  
Insiders and Outsiders: Where they Collide 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 See Cesari’s “sub-culture” lense of the banlieues for a better understanding of resistance in 
outer regions of the Île-de-France.  
136 Muhammed. Appendix A. 
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 It would appear then, to answer questions asked earlier about the two ways of 
addressing the riots with penalization or communication138 it was the former rather than 
the later. As observed by the CCIF, the propaganda from political discourse, media, and –
unfortunately, the French administration itself, has led to specific places of exclusion: the 
inner arrondisements of Paris, schools, libraries, museums, administrative offices, and – 
of particular interest, the Paris metro.  
 Talking about these cases in the region, Marwan revealed telling information. 
Youth from banlieues who go into Paris proper are often subjected to higher levels of 
surveillance by security officials.  In its closely knitted center, teenagers are unduly 
patrolled by security in public shopping centers, museums, and libraries. Accusations 
range from loitering to theft and are based upon appearance and attire. For Muslim 
women, if they choose to wear the hijab, they are not allowed to attend school events 
because of the hijab’s religious affiliation.139 Additionally, in places such as the 6th 
arrondisement, a “fancy neighborhood of Paris”140  Muslim women are often subjected to 
extreme levels of discrimination in cafés, bakeries, restaurants, and public administrative 
offices. Employers will even fire their employees who they know are Muslim. They find 
reasons through unlawful accusations such as using lunch to pray in spaces designated for 
lunch breaks.141  
 From Marwan’s explanations, it appears places of discrimination and separate 
identities display themselves most prominently when one group breaches into a space 
they are not normally associated with.  This creates perceptions of an, “apartheid type of 
ideology. These are the Muslims, these are the non-Muslims, and we’re going to base our 
judgment – our inclusion based on their religious visibility142” Similarly, for the youth in 
the banlieues, the prejudice based upon their appearance creates, “these forms of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Here I am referring to Alain Morice and his article on French responses to the riots (2008). See 
chapter 3 for my analysis.  
139 Muhammed. Appendix A. Here he refers to refused service based on a religious tie.  
140 As described by Marwan.  
141 Muhammed. Appendix A. 
142 Muhammed. Appendix A.  
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animosity between some of the youth living in the suburbs and some of the more posh 
areas as we have, which are completely segregated in terms of social life and 
inclusion.”143 Obvious still, is the impress of places serving as defining points of 
segregation and at the same time areas of belonging. For those living in the Île-de-France, 
as is the case in most all cities world-wide, the association of good and bad 
neighborhoods remains contrasted with central Paris and the banlieues. There is blindness 
on both sides, for those who fear going into the banlieues and those who feel forbidden to 
leave them. In turn, it creates a difficult cycle of reiterated discriminatory remarks, 
inopportunistic views, and disheartened outlooks for residents in the banlieues. Well 
aware that the separation ideology is established in Paris, the Collection Contre 
L’Islamophobie is working hard to break it down. 
 
Campaigning and Mobilization: Using Metro Space as a Political Sphere 
 
 Before speaking with Marwan, I came across their national campaign, Nous Aussi 
Sommes La Nation, on the homepage of their website. Described as the first national 
campaign against Islamophobia, it acted to create awareness around the sentiments, 
questions, and meanings of racism and Islamophobia in France. Beginning in November 
2012, posters, bulletins, press conferences, and radio talks all helped dispel the message 
of Nous Aussi Sommes La Nation. Talking with Marwan about the campaign’s promotion 
and development process, he explained its main, integral message was that as citizens and 
members of the French republic, immigrants, Arabs, Muslims are all a part of France 
without having to change their identity. For them, their daily contributions, their 
participation in and belonging to the state does not ostracize and isolate them. They are 
free to practice their traditions, values, and religions as they are. As citizens, they do not 
have to “get rid of anything that constitutes their identities.”144  In order to break up 	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constructed stereotypes by politicians, the message was precisely constructed to, “not fall 
into the trap of replaying and reproducing the clichés that most Muslims are accused 
of.”145 Upon its launch, CCIF released the campaign through radio discussions, viral 
videos and spatially around the ring peripherique road of the Île-de-France region.   
 Through a platform generating discussion with politicians and radio announcers 
as well as the visual campaigns, the various mediums created a forum that the collective 
used to usher in new and developed ideas for fighting Islamophobia. Important also were 
their deliberate decisions to create a discourse that was balanced and rational.146 They did 
not want to subject it to ideas of a protest, but rather, a space of discussion. Using humor 
and conversation, they wanted to give Nous Sommes Aussi la Nation a feeling of 
openness and approachability. It was purposed to create conversations as well as invoke 
humor.  
 In terms of where the images and bulletins were made visible, billboards around 
the road peeripherique (the road that divides Paris’s inner 20 arrondisments from the 
outlying departments and neighborhoods) displayed the large images. The signs showed 
diverse groups of people holding France’s flag, united under the Republic. Additionally 
throughout other areas of France such as Lyon, images displaying people’s portraits were 
mounted on display at bus stops and other places of transit.147 Publicized in open spaces, 
the message proliferated out to the people of France. 
 Yet in other popular spots to campaign, the collective encountered some 
difficulties. Marwan stated there was a desire to mount the campaign in the Parisian 
metro but that it created a backlash of resistant responses from the publicity agencies in 
charge of metro ad spaces.  A popular spot to campaign, it was here that the collective 
encountered the most difficulty. A public space without their message, presented a 
paradox in terms of what was public space and what was private. With respect to Paris, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Muhammed. Appendix A. 
146 Muhammed. Appendix A. 
147 See the Collective’s ad space in: La Campagne S’Affiche À Lyon.  
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an area of paramount mixing and interaction between people is its underground metro. 
Arguably the metro holds as much cultural significance to the city as it does for its 
massive transit operation. For the commuters, tourists, students and other passengers, the 
metro serves as a place for observance and consideration of events, news and 
advertisements on display in its enclosed tunnels. A valued area for disseminating a 
campaign, Marwan, explained that the metro was, in fact, one of the only places where 
they were not allowed to exhibit their campaign. He stated,  
“Initially we wanted to have the campaign in the metros. But the agency in charge 
of allocating the advertisement space in the metros said, ‘fighting Islamophobia is 
a religious thing and we should not see any women wearing the hijab, -- headscarf 
in the metro for the sake of what we call in France laïcité…So basically, they 
were trying to forbid the campaign from going on in the metro, which is basically 
equating to discriminating an organization, fighting discrimination.”148  
 
Hearing this report, one must take into consideration several factors. First, ad space in the 
metro is highly desirable; it promotes and circulates its content by the very nature of the 
metro itself. It also generates vast numbers of views per day to a wide array of people. 
Whichever ad agency the Collective contacted, they were aware of the marketable value 
and – in this sense, ideological value that their ad spaces hold. Second, in monitoring 
what images are displayed, in this case a woman and her headscarf, private agencies hold 
formidable control of one’s vision of public space. What is presented, who views it, and 
how it is portrayed are all considered of essential importance to the private eye for public 
viewership. Third, in arguing that laïcité applies to the metro specifically under French 
jurisdiction shrinks and disregards what is actually considered public and private space in 
the French context. Under the French law of laïcité, it states the wearing of signs or 
clothing, which elicits the religious affiliation of the student is forbidden in public 
elementary, middle, and high schools.149  Nowhere does the law state that areas such as 
the metro forbid the appropriation and wearing of religious symbols. Herein, it is clear 
that French administrative and private powers not only exert a bias in their powers, but 	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149 For more on the French law of laïcité see Weil (2008).  
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they also exploit and abuse the authority guaranteed by French law. The mere existence 
of France’s law of laïcité shows the extent to which institutionally, privately and even 
territorially, areas in the Île-de-France are prone to subjective and dissimulated 
presentations of civic space. Thus, there is a tension of struggle between those who hold 
authoritative power and those who contest it in the Île-de-France’s collective spaces, in 
this incident, the Parisian metro.  
 For what followed in the aftermath of the metro ad space illustrates how the 
collective’s campaign fighting discrimination was grounded in problematic rooted 
problems tied to identity. Marwan explained in order to present the challenging stance the 
ad agency posed in forbidding the posters’ display, the collective decided to utilize their 
discrimination as part of the discourse and debates around the issues. He states,  
“We published some of the information to the press. It was massively positive for 
us because we had the debate, why is it so taboo to say that there is Islamophobia 
in France? Why is it so taboo that an agency like the metro advertising agency 
would take an ideological stance about these posters and why is it so taboo to 
admit that the French society today is diverse?150”  
 
Marwan’s questions get at the core of the French issue. Diversity is not a new 
phenomenon in France. Yet why is it so highly censored? Made evident from the ad 
space affair, the metro advertising agency gives weight to what the collective seeks to 
overthrow. There is a discrimination existent in French society. Yet it has become 
convoluted within spatial, ideological and actual boundaries in the Île-de-France. Why 
does there continue to be a lingering creation of separation of space? And why does it 
seem that it is often the case that these places of separation occur in seemingly open, 
autonomous establishments such as the metro, the cafes and restaurants in and around 
Paris?  
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Providing Spaces to Live: The Necessities of a Home 
 
 In my efforts to further make clear the separation of space and identity for the 
respective banlieues of Paris, I looked at associations in the Île-de-France recognized for 
their involvement in providing aid to both public and private housing. One group I came 
across was Solidarités Nouvelles pour le Logement (Resources to provide Solidarity in 
Housing, SNL). A volunteer based network, low-income individuals and families are 
given temporary lodging until they are able to find permanent and sustainable residences 
in their proper cités. Normally, these people are connected to what SNL calls, the vie du 
Groupe Local. Acting as a support system, volunteer residents act as counselors to the 
family’s needs. The mission is to help beneficiaries from beginning to end for a 
successful reinsertion back into society. Corresponding with Marie-Camille Raffin, their 
head of press, I discovered that the organization is well established in five departments in 
the Île-de-France: Paris, Yvelines, Essonne, Hauts-de-Seine et Val-de-Marne.  
 I was directed to a map of where exact localities and lodgings are offered in the 
Île-de-France. Located on the following page (Figure 1) the red-housed symbols indicate 
where at risk and low-income people have been lodged by volunteers involved in SNL.  
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 Figure 1: Map of SNL aided housing in their respective departments151 
 
From the map presented above, the five departments mentioned in SNL’s press 
documentations are visibly marked with their concentrations of housing establishments.  
 Curious as to why the Seine-St-Denis department was not equally represented, I 
asked Marie about SNL’s singular five department placement behind the notable lapse of 
representations. In her explanation, Seine-St-Denis does hold some lodging. However, 
the SNL does not hold a departmental association with the Seine-St-Denis region. An 
additional part of her explanation was that because it is a volunteer based network, they 
are not present elsewhere in the other parts of the Île-de-France region. Housing 
accommodations remain organized around the epicenter of Paris and other more wealthy 
departments. True to the Île’s separated economic spheres, the SNL’s mission appeared 
to be reaching out only insofar to those who were aware of its existence. Arranged in this 
manner, I was struck by how off kilter the hosted housing was. Pitched to one side, the 
map clearly shows how strikingly polarized the North-Eastern region is. The existence of 
resources provided by the SNL in the Île has made many leaps and bounds for those who 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Figure 1. Map provided by Press Documentation of SNL’s work and mission. P 3.  
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benefit. Yet those who remain perennially on the outskirts face larger borders to cross.  
 In social terms though, there is a civic traversal across lines spatially in the Île-de-
France. For those who face housing constraints, they are supported by private 
homeowners. To this end, the SNL unites two very different groups of people who would 
otherwise most likely never interact. While not mixed housing, the relationships 
established help erode away the social stigmas and misconceptions of people living in 
deprived areas around Paris. Marie acknowledges the long-term relation between the 
landlords and boarders creates real relationships, exchanging stories and giving aid and 
advice.152 In their relationship, Marie describes that both volunteers and social workers 
act, showing renters how to take charge of their accounts and make and follow records. It 
is, as Marie states, a real relationship, with regular visits and check ups. Housing 
management and labor cost savings are all comprised and taken into account.  
With the creation of the Besson law in 1990, SNL receives grants and subsidaries 
from the state to help them in their efforts. Since its passing, 65% of all grants fund the 
housing.153The duration of their stay on average lasts between three to four years. During 
this time they get adjusted and back on their feet. In this way, they are given the time to 
stabilize and find social housing. Once capable to make a move, lodgers normally find 
their new homes in social HLM housing.154 In a paradoxical sense, their move from 
private to public housing resituates them into the outer periphery context. However, for 
its social and hopeful endeavors, inhabitants in the Île-de-France are given a sense of 
connection and help. By its numbers alone, the SNL organization has helped 7,000 
lodgers find and acquire housing.155 
A groundbreaking stance away from the bureaucratic approach of France’s social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
153Raffin, Appendix C. Relating to the establishment of France’s Besson Law in 1991, Epstein 
and Kirszbaum (2003) present compelling information related to the social mixing that French 
politics and policies argue for and the natural state of the city.  
154 Raffin Appendix C.  
155 Number provided by SNL’s annual report. See “Solidarités Nouvelles pour le Logement: 
Dossier de presse” 
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housing policies is the wholesome approach organizations such as SNL and CCIF carry 
out. Present in their missions is an essential element: a human resources and contact. The 
availability of someone to talk to, seek advice and consultation from, strives to bridge and 
create stronger ties and mutual lines between people in the Île-de-France. Aside from a 
government run suprastucture, these organizations are helpful because of their ties as 
focal points of people interacting. Minority citizens feel less helpless in the face of large 
administrations because they have these places to go to.  
 Another representative I spoke with was Martin Dassieu, who helps run the PACT 
organization in the Île-de-France. Different from the Solidarité des Nouvelles Logements, 
the PACT is for private housing. Public and private housing in France are operated in 
different fashions. For their objectives, the PACT operates to help homeowners more 
easily renovate and rework their homes. They act through three objectives: finding 
financial assets to help orchestrate the housing project, amassing the resources and 
experts necessary and finally completion of the project. It is an effort that remains 
connected to the PACT for both economical and housing specialized reasons. According 
to Dassieu, because they operate democratically and do not pass expenses federally 
through the state, they are economically less expensive. They give a quality to their 
housing renovations without necessarily being overpriced and expensive156.  
 PACT operates to help those who can afford to pay for the costs of renovations. 
From Dassieu’s explanations, passing through state regulations, the organization 
effectively helps home-owners. However, it is not state-subsidized, setting them apart 
from normal social housing that the state oversees. In this sense, PACT has a liberal 
reformative measure, empowering and helping individuals with their home goals. The 
PACT is an acroynym for: Propaganda Action Contre (against) the Taudis (slums). Used 
only in its acroynym form today, The PACT was created in 1930 before World War II. 
Following World War I, many cities in France had been horribly destroyed. The PACT 	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was created to help reinforce and reconstruct many of the homes and buildings after the 
first World War.  
 It was not until the 1950s and 1960s, returning back to the work done by Le 
Corbusier, that Paris’s Grands Ensembles were created. The PACT was involved in their 
construction, however it was not until truly afterwards in the 80’s and 90’s that the 
noticeable decline appeared in the grands ensembles. It was at this moment a new 
intervention took place to help them. Dassieu explained that it was precisely after WWII 
that, in what he termed, “les populations sinistrées” were placed specifically in the Seine-
St-Denis department. Now, many of the operations and urban renewal projects are 
organized out from the state into this department. The most young, the most poor, 
Dassieu concludes it is here that that there is the highest concentration of grands 
ensembles. Existent still today, as Marwan had concluded, is an axe of economic polarity. 
On one side there are the rich, and on the other, the poor. It is, as always, the east versus 
the west.  
 It is a conclusion that repeatedly comes up. The Île-de-France is dividedly 
economically. Classes are separate. The state works insofar as providing housing, yet it 
still does not  provide the livelihood that is needed.  
 
 
The Here and Now: Movement Towards Better Development? 
 
 From presenting the societal ideology around the history, recent discourse and 
current debates on the many identities within the Île-de-France – and France at large, I 
hope to have established within the spatial frameworking of the Île-de-France region, a 
long-lasting impression of connections to identity and place within the French mindset. 
From multiple perspectives, academic, historical, sociological, and political, it is apparent 
that there has long been a debilitating conformed idea around those who live in the 
banlieues and those who live in Paris. Speaking directly with representatives of 
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associations such as Collectif Contre L’Islamophobie, citizens are empowering 
themselves to speak out against institutional, political, and civic biases and prejudices 
they experience.  
 Yet the histories of areas, while distinctly parts and places of an identity, can and 
do change. The difficulties in assessing these periods of change is by which means and 
who exactly implements the change. For the Île-de-France, the surveillance and heavy 
policing of the regions was a component of their identity. Yet in what ensued from the 
rioting, while at times dualistically penalizing and aiding, there was an outcome. The 
need for direct change and expansion was iterated by Sarkozy, when he heralded in his 
plans for a Grand Paris. Moving forward now to the progression and development of the 
Grand Paris Express, one must also note the tonality of the project and what is at stake for 
those involved. As Marwan had noted, moments of discrimination and stereotyping occur 
when politicians and media present people and their affiliation – be it to a religion, 
neighborhood or appearance, in a negative light. For progressing into its new chapters of 
development and the desires of these neighborhoods, the Grand Paris Express is 
envisioned as an all-encompassing project of economic growth and urban development. It 
hopes to provide efficiency and mass transit out to the departments outside of the Île-de-
France. In their discursive claims about the importance of residents’ voice and 
participation in the development of the Grand Paris Express, it would seem that their 
directors are intent on a participatory, active voice and dialogue from their residents.  
 When I spoke to Marwan specifically about the Grand Paris Express, for their part, 
his association is not affiliated with any part of the planning. Interestingly, he observed 
that not many people were involved in the Grand Paris Express. But for what is at stake 
with the public transit system outside of the greater Paris area he emphasized, is an 
infrastructural participation of exclusion that these lines bring to the Paris suburbs. The 
question he has, and I have as well is, “How can we tackle these issues, how can we build 
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a network of transport that’s going to bring these people into the society?”157 It is an 
important question to pose, one that pulls in strong consideration for the region’s people. 
I found it to be a discernable and interesting point. For his cautionary questioning, it is 
true that the region must be aiming to move forward and change their habits. For, as they 
move forward into their planning, the changes they make today will greatly alter and 
affect the decisions they make tomorrow. To justify and fully appreciate their stance, I 
think it is noteworthy to see how the CCIF’s work is humanely based. For them, they see 
how fully unintegrated these citizens are. Thus, to justify a transit oriented developmental 
growth may be possible, but at the core of the matter are people’s real livelihoods. 
 Curious to see what other opinions were around the development of the Grand 
Paris Express, I also spoke with Martin Dassieu about his views. From what he 
understood, the Grand Paris Express is a revisionist view of the Île-de-France’s potential. 
Returning back to the problem where jobs are concentrated in the region, Martin Dassieu 
stated that the majority of jobs are situated in Paris, yet this is not where the majority of 
people live. Paris right now is in a state of centrality, thanks to its metro and the multiple 
jobs available there. Dassieu is in favor for the Grand Paris Express. He reasons that from 
its creation, the Île-de-France will be able to create two centralities. Its objective is to 
create other central points in the region and this can be achieved through the new outlined 
routes.  
 Dassieu explained that after the 1970s and 1980s, France discontinued the 
production of its auto-routes, the equivalent of freeways that we have in the United States. 
The auto-routes had been created in large part due to the popularity of the automobile, 
yet interestingly after the 1980s, France returned back to its emphasis on mass public 
transportation158. His testimony aligns well with past studies of transit planning for Paris. 
Past analyses conducted for planning in the Parisian region assess that there have been 
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certain adjustments to wanting more accessible transit for the masses. Interestingly, 
regional transit developer for the RATP, Michel Barbier reported that the primary 
roadwork had been developed in a modified “radiocentric form” to serve Paris’s proposed 
new towns. Car ownership had also increased in the 50s and 60s for France. The 
highways created such as the road péeriphérique made sense to meet the demands. Yet 
they did not prevail as the new hegemonic transport system. A study forecasting future 
transportation needs for the Île-de-France concluded that despite the addition of roadways 
a completely new rapid transit system was needed, in order to link the new towns with 
Paris159. What I found particularly eerie about Barbier’s work looking at transportation 
needs over the years, was how similar the assessments were to today’s planning of the 
Grand Paris Express. For example, possible ideas for improved transportation included, 
connecting regional railway lines across Paris, extending existing metro lines to the 
suburbs, creating busways into the suburbs, and constructing new orbital lines in the 
inner suburban ring160. From Barbier’s study dating all the way back to 1972, we have 
now come to the same conclusions for the Île-de-France.  
 Comparing cars to rail and the metro, Dassieu explained that use of the car in 
Paris is actually very different and complicated. Gas is expensive and citizens have 
difficulty parking and finding places. He asserts that there is an additional ecological 
aspect. With the region’s preoccupation and concern for the environment, there is heavy 
taxation on cars. Aside from pollution taxes, Dassieu said that to place a high tax on cars, 
as he explained exists in other cities such as London or Berlin, is unimaginable in France. 
There is a common tendency and unpopularity to have cars in France. Parking is hard to 
find, the arrangement of the city makes circulation difficult and traffic is copious and 
time consuming. In complimenting the transit that already exists in the there, the transit 
map in common functions beautifully. Privileging and placing valor on French 
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transportation back into importance, the Île-de-France is returning back to the armature it 
was constructed upon. 
 Recurring since the ideas of Lefebvre, is the importance of an integrated, socially 
connected city. The planning for the Grand Paris Express seems to expressly have a 
desire, or at least a presentation of, this integrated and connected city. However, from 
merely a network of mass transit, is it feasible to both ideologically and spatially 
transform and help the residents from these disadvantaged neighborhoods? As I have thus 
far examined, the Île-de-France is historically a place of growth, yet also a place of 
embedded preconceptions and labeled prejudices in its neighborhoods.  
 
 
Systems of Change and Movement Forward 
 
 For concluding this chapter and moving forward to current processes and 
revitalizations of Paris’s mass transit to outer districts of France, a presidential campaign 
video from the past 2012 elections supporting François Hollande, well encapsulates 
precisely what is hopeful and unfortunately also problematic for the planning of the 
Grand Paris Express. The video opens with the caption, “L’changement c’est maintenant” 
(the change is now) and proceeds to list five neighborhoods, Creil, Les Ulis, Aubervilles, 
Clichy-Sous-Bois and Aulnay-Sous-Bois all outer departments of greater Paris. Shots of 
diverse residents an array of blacks, arabs, and whites hold their electoral voting cards, 
smiling at the camera, and speaking out presidential candidate François Hollande’s name. 
Other images show Hollande traveling by the rail RER line to the various communes, 
shaking hands with his supporters. One woman is filmed excitedly sharing the news that, 
“Yes! François Hollande – he is on the train!”161 It all symbolically ties together the main 
essence of the political call to revitalize and empower the outer communes of Paris. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 Translation is my own, from the campaign video: 
“http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BOXhp0BuaiM” 
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Moreover, it presents a heterogeneous crowd of supporters for Hollande, playing on the 
thematic, and realness of a diverse body politic in the Île-de-France. Yet there is an edge 
of the same state-protectionist, disconnected, government led-centrality, that is especially 
heightened from its placement and portrayal of space.162 How though, can the two be 
reconciled? Space begets identites and stereotypes. Coming to terms with the two, one 
must acknowledge places as means of identity but also as means of change and alteration.  
 As we can see from the recent elections, the civil unrest of the past, and the 
current fight against discrimination in France, there are many facets to the social-spatial 
dynamics in the Île-de-France. It is in a period of conceptual revival.  Given all of the 
now established associations, debates and minorities effectively place themselves at the 
precipice of the region’s transformation. It must be made clear that in my explorations to 
follow, the series of new lines planned for the greater Paris area have yet to be installed. 
It remains to be seen how, and if, these new networks of Paris will, as Marwan questions, 
“bring these people into the city?” The complexities of an integrated society will not be 
resolved by a transit network alone. However, I seek to demonstrate, that this grid of 
mobility serves as a precursor to a more highly networked Île-de-France, both spatially 
and socially.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 A discretionary note: In an article published by the lab, the director of François Hollande’s 
campaign, Vincent Faltesse assures that the official campaign did not solicit the release of Kanye 
West’s and Jay-Z’s song to accompany the campaign video. http://lelab.europe1.fr/t/clip-pro-
hollande-si-jay-z-kanye-west-ont-un-probleme-on-changera-la-bande-son-1819  
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Chapter Five: What to Expect from the Grand Paris Express 	  
 At this moment, the Île-de-France is taking sweeping measures to catch up to a no 
longer homogenous society. City planners, politicians, and residents openly recognize the 
dissimilarities between central Paris and its outlying cités and suburbs. The unraveling of 
policies and political debates over the banlieues and an elevated awareness of 
discrimination since the urban riots of 2005 all measure the directives being taken 
towards a renewed and re-imagined city.  
 In a different fashion from their normally state-led, welfare driven economic 
policies, regional actors, both private and public, are working in conjunction with the 
central government to viably solve the problemes des banlieues. In their various roles, the 
state, non-governmental organizations, and regional planners are working to change the 
landscape of the Île-de-France. Solving the varying degrees of social and economic 
problems in a land marred by a deeply authoritarian history presents a high wall that will 
be difficult to overcome.  
 Conceptually, in this chapter I will introduce many ideas that touch on what 
effectively makes a city function. From many disciplines and schools of thought, urban 
planning systematically operates in many ways. Furthermore, I plan on discussing the 
differentiation between urban planning and urban renewal in order to clarify and perhaps 
elucidate upon the ideas behind the Grand Paris Express. Using theorists and case studies 
of urban projects from scholars and theorists such as Patrick Simon, Andrew Newman 
and Steinhardt, I seek to demonstrate that a city and what helps it function harmoniously 
is its movement, as well as a sense of belonging and identity to specific areas.  
 For discussing the process of the Grand Paris Express, the implementation of its 
lines remains centrally connected to the concepts of a larger Paris, its outlying cités, and 
in this case a re-imagined Paris. I will show the beginnings of the planning, as drawn out 
by Nicolas Sarkozy, the law enacted later, and what is now currently happening in social 
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discourse and official rhetoric of the Société du Grand Paris, the agency behind the 
operations.  
 In concluding my fifth chapter, I want to combine the ideas I have about transit 
and social mobility.  Additionally, I want to elaborate on the connections individuals 
make within their environments and the possible extensions of social capitol they can 
create with more mobility. Spanning out and planning for Paris’s new transit is something 
that one can only hope will improve the social capitol of and accessibility to other 
resources for the residents of these areas. Yet it is a difficult and still somewhat 
ambiguous concept to apply.  
 
How People Effectively Alter a Space 
 
 Before looking specifically at the Grand Paris Express, I want to include a 
specific case study of spatial-political activism in a northeastern neighborhood of Paris. 
Scholar Andrew Newman conducted an ethnographic study of efforts led by residents of 
West-African and Maghribi descent to put a park in their neighborhood. In his 
dissertation he argues that from the collaborative efforts of policy makers, urban planners, 
and the residents themselves, the process of urbanization formulates spaces of political 
change while also creating a sense of cultural belonging. By their association with the 
group, the residents were involved with the restructuring urban space at the material and 
symbolic level163. Organized as the Association Jardin d’Éole (AJE) the mobilization 
efforts helped put in a field green park in what would have been a diesel truck depot. A 
point of observation to note is the singular distinction of this movement.  Newman chose 
to focus only on one neighborhood in Paris.  On the outlying periphery of the 
neighborhood is specifically multi-ethnic, in a post-industrial area that, contrary to the 
banlieues, is still Paris proper. In this light, Newman asserts that the AJE,  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 See Newman’s ethnographic dissertation, “Landscaping Discontent: Space, Class and Social 
Movements in Immigrant Paris”  
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“echoes the class structure of the global city itself, with acute divisions between 
middle class European descended French, second and third generation Maghrebi 
residents who were also middle or working class, and an extremely poor 
generation of first generation immigrants, particularly from West Africa.”164   
 
In both their ethnic and economic differences, these residences uniquely occupied and 
organized through a channel that, in its diverse organizing, remained connected to the 
specificity of the proper neighborhood as the centralizing root of their community efforts. 
The events that transpired demonstrate the singularity and power of organizations to push 
forward their specific goals, in this case, a social and green environment designed to give 
a shared space to the community. Critical to highlight also was the sway AJE held in 
contesting what was planned by other, much more powerful national industries in order to 
uphold their goals of a green space. 165 
 In including Newman’s observations, this chapter seeks to demonstrate that there 
are areas that do contain elements of social and economic mixing in the Île-de-France. 
These districts all contain their proper history, distinct groups of people, and formation in 
an increasingly global city that is Paris. What marks this story’s singularity perhaps is its 
definitive beginning and ending. Seeing the problems marked by years of urban decay, 
increased violence, and poor living conditions, an organization materialized within a  
community, demanded a park and –in the end, they now have a “vibrant green space166” 
that is heavily used. What’s more, the neighborhoods assembling under the AJE, helped 
advance and push forward the goals of an area, that otherwise would have been diversely 
stratified and afflicted by urban decline.  
 What Newman highlights is not so much the collective shared identity of these 
people in this organization but rather their shared idealism of a space and what it can give 
to a community.  With this as the case, the AJE and its positioning in the North Eastern 
area of Paris poses a fluidity to the group, its demographic, and their territorial belonging. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Newman, 34.  
165 Newman notes that due to a combination of good political timing, leadership, and the strength 
in remaining united helped overturn rival efforts to transform the abandoned freight train station 
into privatized space.  
166 Ibid, 202. 
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Their one objective, which remained centralized and fixed, was the area itself.167 In the 
emerging stages of the lands development, high stakeholders were already invested. 
Called the Cour du Maroc (translated as the Morrocan court) the property was owned by 
French’s National railroad, the SNCF.168 But after a lapsed period of involvement from 
both the SNCF and city council, little was being done towards the direct planning for the 
Cour du Maroc. Newman speculates that from this disjointed effort at the national level, 
and the unionized efforts at the local level, there was successive progression with 
residents under the AJE in mobilizing their campaign for a park.169 Indeed, the wants and 
desires of a community often emphasize the needs of a green space. Returning back to 
Lefebvre and his forewarnings of the industrialization of space, he argues that the 
proximity of nature is of crucial importance for people and their place.170  Of primary 
concern is often the need for a space of greenery. For this place in particular, the area was 
both green and socio-politically oriented.  
 At a coinciding moment globally, apparent also was the push towards “green 
space.” Defined under umbrellas of “sustainability” and “green urbanism” Newman 
asserts the AJE’s aim was, “itself a product of de-industrialization and burgeoning urban 
environmentalism in North America and Europe.”171 By this measure, their urbanizing 
efforts were inasmuch a global awareness for the necessity of a green environment within 
space and the neighborhood’s specific desire. To this end, the Cour du Maroc was being 
reappropriated and reclaimed, moving away from disadvantageous construction of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 In his observations, Newman articulates that from the collective efforts by these residents to 
address the social degradation of their area, there was this desirable need to transform an 
otherwise unused space into an actual place centered around, “a better life for the neighborhood”. 
140. 
168 While an abandoned site, the SNCF still owned the property. However, Newman observes that 
from its lack of purpose (at this point the site was a refuse deposit from tunnel digging a new 
commuter line, the RER E) there were competing uses and creations of the space. 135.  
169 After 1998, the SNCF announced that the Cour du Maroc would be split between the Tafanel 
company (50%), its own freight operations (40%), and potentially, “a small neighborhood garden” 
(10%). 141. 
170 See Lefebvre, La Revolution Urbaine.  
171 Newman, 143.  
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buildings, as directed by national companies, and moving towards a space for life, 
community, and a focal point of recreation.  
 For considering Newman’s ethnographic study in comparison to the Grand Paris 
Express project currently occurring in the Île-de-France, one could claim that these two 
movements –one organized from a localized, grassroots organization, and the other 
delegated and legislated from the national level, invariably leads to an oppositional and 
contradictory movement for effectual socio-spatial justice. Even within the context of a 
four hectacre park, Newman himself poses the questionability of alternate results 
occurring from the improved desirability of the space. Known in urban planning as 
gentrification, many definitions have arisen in the past few decades. The phenomenon is 
difficult to measure and define because for each urbanizing area, the end results are 
repeatedly different. In large part because globally, cities respond differently to lowered 
rent and vacancy and their respective districts all have their own unique urban history. 
For studies of gentrification in Paris, there is little literature on its existence, yet as 
compared with American cities, much of its evolution and process occurs in a similar 
manner. Writing about gentrification reshaping the inner arrondisements in Paris, author 
____ notes its only recent emergence in French literature and the various ways it occurs 
in Paris’s inner districts. Describing the precise process as where,  
“The middle class and upper middle class settle in older and working-class areas 
in the center of great cities and that leads to the restoring of housing. It creates a 
new frontier within cities that deeply reshapes the social division of urban space. 
In the city of Paris, gentrification is part of a wider process of long-term 
‘embourgeoisement’ that concerns even the upper class areas172”  
 
While connected to notions of trends currently seen in the United States, the case of Paris 
stays unique for several reasons. Foremost is the established residency of the upper class 
in Paris.  The market value of real estate in central Paris is exceptionally high, in large 
part because of the already established wealth in the west bank. Thus, the historically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 See, Clerval’s “Gentrification, a frontier reshaping social division of urban space in the Inner 
Paris” 1.  
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poor working class neighborhoods, such as the Latin Quarter undergo a long-term 
process of gentrification, what Clerval defines as embourgeoisement.173 What results, due 
in large part to both a state preservation of social housing combined with new renovations 
by upper middle class, are luxury apartments adjacent to rundown ones. This “micro-
scale segregation” creates shared spaces in inner Paris. 174 Yet according to Clerval, “even 
when gentrifiers and working-class people are neighbors, they don’t meet each other very 
much.”175 Difficult to determine whether this lack of interaction can be specifically 
applied to Parisians alone, it is nonetheless pertinent to a communicative breach between 
members of a different class. Additionally, citing the working class as primarily poor 
immigrants of Africa or Asia, as well as old French working-class people implies that 
there is not a lack of proximity to different and diverse groups of people living in central 
Paris, but rather, a distinct lack of social mixing. For their part, however, despite living in 
economically disadvantageous circumstances, there are seldom reports of high levels of 
racism or discrimination in these neighborhoods in France.  
 For the case of the neighborhoods in the 18th and 19th arrondisements where 
Newman observed, historically, they have remained markedly multi-cultural, immigrant 
neighborhoods. Indeed, as early as the 1990’s scholars such as Patrick Simon gathered 
examinations of the dynamic relationship between inter-class, cross-cultural living 
situations in the outer arrondisements, specifically Belleville.176 Additionally, to bring the 
whole rhetoric of a “green movement” distinguishes the resulting park, named Jardins 
d’Éole, as a mobilization that centers itself around what scholars Checker and Dooling 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Ibid. 2.  
174 Clerval (2006).  
175 Ibid, 8.  
176 Simon wrote about specifically the 20th arrondisement, known as the “melting-pot” of Paris 
and officially as Belleville. Given its relative proximity to the 19th and 18th arrondisements, much 
of the outer neighborhoods of Paris’s 20 inner districts retain a reputation as immigrant, multi-
factious places to live. See, Simon (1995).  
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call, “green gentrification177” that will only further capitalist urbanization. However, 
Newman parleys with these assertions, concluding,  
“To be sure, aspects of the mobilization were ‘classically environmentalist” in the 
sense that it pursued anti-pollution politics and advocated for green space in a 
post-industrial area largely berefit of parks. These ends, however, were seen as an 
extension of ongoing struggles that were ‘classically urban’: questions of 
overcrowded housing, a deteriorated built environment, public spaces increasingly 
dominated by the illegal drug economy, and a general lack of shared, community 
facilities” 
 
Here the circuitous question of space and the socio-economic problems posed to the 
urban environment comes into question. Undeniably, the urban environment is subject to 
change, both in social and economic lights. Accordingly, there are unintended 
consequences for all involved, the planners, investors, those who live there, and those 
who move. Yet in the case of the Jardins d’Éole, from its original intention to better the 
community, demonstrates that those involved sought what Newman writes was, 
“unimaginable a decade ago.”178  As is proving to be the case, urban revival and renewal 
in Paris takes on new meanings and evolutions that reproduce existent problems but 
which also produce solvable and positive outcomes. At an increasing speed, spatial 
justice is being demanded –and met, in the Île-de-France.  
 
Drawing Connections: Grassroots versus State Led 
 
 Where though, in the context of the Grand Paris Express, is there a demand for 
movement? The explorations of current urban renewal such as Newman’s ethnographic 
study help devolve away from the methodical, capitalist underpinnings in much of the 
literature on urban planning, yet – as this chapter presents, much of the idealism around 
the Grand Paris Express, is in its neo-capitalist venture.  Present throughout its 
publications, demands for competition and improved economic efficiency surface for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Newman discusses the possibility of a gentrification where profit accumulation from green 
space and increased desirability disposes and displaces the poor who originally lived in the area. 
These results are the outcome of an institutionalization of environmental politics all pinned to 
capital accumulation  (Smith 2002) 179. 
178 Newman, 202. 
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plans of the region. Additionally it would appear that there is notably no specific 
organization, besides the Société du Grand Paris and other national groups, focusing on 
the orchestration of improved transit.  This suggests a misalignment of societal and 
infrastructural development for the Ile-de-France.  
 Furthermore, in terms of scale, one must be wary to abstract and draw the same 
conclusions for what will occur with the Grand Paris Express from what resulted for 
residents and their park in the northeastern neighborhood of Paris. Indeed, a 26 million 
dollar park179 is not on the same level of a now estimated 29.5 billion euro mass transit 
network180. It is not a singular department, neighborhood, or commune affected, but the 
Île-de-France at large. Yet it is this process of urbanization that is perhaps the most 
illustrious, showing a convergence of changed social attitudes, spatial dimensions, and 
access into the city. Now following the Grand Paris Express, its evolution, and the people 
involved, the objectives may be expressing exactly what the Île-de-France requires to 
evolve into a truly global city.  
 At its outset, visions for the Grand Paris as laid out by Nicolas Sarkozy’s team of 
ten architects included all of the facets of a beautiful, larger and modernized Paris. One of 
these facets, drawn up by French architect and political activist Roland Castro, was a park, 
positioned on the ring highway road. Called the “Parc Courneuve” Castro had long been 
involved in thinking of urban changes that could be applied to help improve the 
conditions of the banlieues 181. For forward thinking urban planners like Castro, putting in 
places of cultural and spatial significance was an applied component in the primary plans 
for Sarkozy’s Grand Paris. On April 29th, 2009, Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the French 
Republic, delivered an eloquent and commandeering speech for his novel and ambitious 
city planning project: a Grand Paris. For those in attendance, he opened up asserting the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 Newman, 27. 
180 Gouvernenment fr. “Le Nouveau Grand Paris: pour une region competitive et solidaire”  
181 Sarkozy, "Le Grand Paris, 4 ans après, les Grands Projets en Cours." Transcript of Nicolas 
Sarkozy’s speech. 
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need for an “adjusted habit of thought and behavior182” to implement an actual change of 
urban management. Continuing on to list the behaviors of planners, engineers, architects, 
and of Paris itself, Sarkozy demanded that the molds of urban planning be broken to, 
“break the order of the city that has caused so much damage, separating the city where, in 
fact, the city must be brought together and reunited183”. A president know for his blunt 
and un-professional demeanor, Sarkozy’s speech celebrated the grandeur that was Paris, 
yet it also had a condemning tone, pointing to the faults of routinely celebrating the 
dream of Paris while ignoring its defaults.  
 Citing the need for truth, beauty, and the grandness of Paris to compete with the 
other global cities in the modern world, Sarkozy also observed a fourth component 
essential to the new Grand Paris: a just and fair city184. In a turn of commiseration, he 
echoed many of the feelings of helplessness expressed by the rioters from 2005, and 
argued that the city should not exclude the needy and helpless, but rather uplift and 
support them. It was a complete turnabout from the tacitly racist and discriminatory 
remarks he had made several years earlier, when addressing how to deal with the heavy 
policing and youth delinquency observed by the French Republic185.  It was a speech 
calling for the residents of Paris to acknowledge and affirm the values of the Republic, 
and the need for Paris to progress into the future. It was a moving speech, enveloping all 
of the problems the Île-de-France was experiencing with demands for improved transit, 
housing, and a monumental park. In the weeks following, questions about its cost, who 
would orchestrate the project, and its overall feasibility were posed. To shave off costs, 
the likeness of the 2009 Grand Paris to today’s current groundwork lacks the beauty and 
cultural aesthetic of the Parc Courneuve. Instead, it subsidizes planning for the transit and 
renovation of already existing RER lines in the area. In a turn towards austerity, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Ibid, Translation is my own.  
183 Ibid, Translation is my own. 
184 Ibid, Translation is my own.  
185 Social-Discourse. “They are rabble and scum” See Calvet, Véronis (2008) for more 
explorations of Sarkozy’s word choice and right-wing rhetoric.  
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Société du Grand Paris and planners have narrowed their focus to a transit-oriented 
infrastructure as opposed to the civic and communal value of a park. Because of that, 
there is a definite contrast with the Grand Paris Express project to a project such as the 
Jardins d’Éole.  
 However, despite its obvious shift away from creating community spaces, the 
plans for the Grand Paris Express place an emphasis on the Ile-de-France as a whole, 
aiming for a more connected and linked region. In the project’s stages of progression, it is 
interesting to see what is given merit and what is ruled out.  Strategically, urban planners 
appear to be at a crossroads for deciding what is best for communities in growing cities. 
Gauging what installation is more valuable – for example a park versus a rail line, points 
out the varying degree of changes planners have in choosing what is best for the urban 
landscape. The rail lines are designed to provide accessible transit and englobe the Ile-de-
France into a connected web. However, where the residents live reinforces perceptions 
about the area and the people living there. Thus, it may be a question of altering the 
spaces themselves and not only the rail lines. 
 In an interview with Roger Karoutchi, then regional counselor of the Île-de-
France, as well as the UMP political party secreraty of state, several questions about the 
direction and future of departmental organization within the Île-de-France were discussed. 
In terms of its overall division, Karoutchi emphasized that prior to the inauguration of the 
Grand Paris, the central government had been disengaged and that regionally in France, 
the Île-de-France had leveraged the centrality of power, resulting in ignored communes. 
For its large and diversified size, the central government had an obligation to intervene 
and oversee the planning and implementation for the state. He elucidates upon this point, 
stating, “This is to say that among the interests of local legitimate actors, one has to 
define that arguably there is a sole public power the state has in governing the Île-de-
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France186”. The interventionary power of France’s central government raises an 
interesting aspect to the dynamics of the Grand Paris Express. For one, it demonstrates 
there was disorganization to the governing powers of the region.  
 
Size and Scope 
 
 Comprised of over 55 communes, the Île-de-France politically and socio-
economically has a diverse array of people and needs. Therein, in terms of its scale and 
affect on the region as a whole, the central and state power pushed to advance and 
forward the message of Grand Paris: A region that was disparate and stratified, to a 
region connected with mass transit. In all of its discussion of a cohesive and better 
functioning region, the interventionary role the executive government held speaks to an 
additional, and perhaps more hidden meaning behind their motives. The city of Paris is a 
reflection of all that France represents: a rich culture, an imbued relationship to aesthetics 
and open space, with a harmonious functionality overseen by the government. For the 
riots of 2005 proving that this, in fact, wasn’t the case, marks how significantly there was 
a separation of these French elements to the Île-de-France. Thus, seeking a need for 
solidarity and cohesion refers also to the government’s need to regain control of the 
region. Despite its prevailing themes of efficiency, renewal, and expansion, the Grand 
Paris Express can easily be constructed and viewed in the opposite light. By their desire 
to holistically integrate all of the members of the Île-de-France into its rings and 
infrastructure, the state holds authoritarian motives as well.  
 Critical to evaluate is the nature and ulterior motives of the French state and their 
co-partnered private public management from the Société du Grand Paris. After the 
mixed reactions to his Grand Paris inaugural address, the Sarkozy administration worked 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186Le Monde Fr. “Quel Grand Paris prepare Nicolas Sarkozy?” Debate with Roger Karoutchi” p. 2 
Translation is my own.  
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adamantly on a bill proposal for the project187 and a little over a year later, the Grand 
Paris was enacted into law as, an “urban project, socially and economically of national 
interest to strategically unit the territories of the Île-de-France188” Established into law, 
Sarkozy’s urban project was indivisible to state and region, territories and departments. 
Written in its literature, the law incorporated various platforms for discussion, 
incorporating into its writing language stressing an open forum for public debate.  
 Extensive and full of reformed urban policies, the law contains 36 articles and 
covers a substantial amount of notices including the development of a scientific hub in 
Saclay, the Societe du Grand Paris serving as moderator of the project, new housing, and 
the specifications for implementing the new transit lines.189 For assessing how closely the 
law has followed and held onto the principles of the project, announcements and the 
management by the Société du Grand Paris aims to be transparent and communicative. 
Their engagement with the various communes concerned with the transit lines gives 
weight to their aura of fair and democratic discourse. However, to accurately know what 
takes precedence in their planning is as of yet indistinguishable.  
 Since its passing, the law of 2010 has led to an ongoing series of reformulated and 
rethought issues integral to the outer departments in the region, as well as the entirety of 
the French republic. As recently as March 2013, Jean-Marc Ayrault, France’s Prime 
Minister, confirmed continued planning for, and reformations to the Grand Paris project. 
Situated between two poles, competition and solidarity, Ayrault condoned the necessity 
of the two for a prospering Ile-de-France region.  Framing solidarity through sound 
objectives such as passing housing construction from 40,000 to 70,000 each year, it also 
integrated the need for an acknowledgement to have social mixing in the region and a 
campaign against all forms of segregation.190 Acknowledging the polarization between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 Hollinger, Peggy. “Sarkozy unveils Grand Plan for Paris” Financial Times, April 29, 2009.  
188 LOI n°2010-597 du 3 juin 2010 relative au Grand Paris (1).  
189 LOI n°2010-597 du 3 juin 2010 relative au Grand Paris.   
190 Ayrault, “Le Nouveau Grand Paris: pour une Region Competitive et Solidaire” Translation is 
my own. 
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people in the region and a distinct spatial segregation contributes to a movement towards 
and reformatted French model.  
 Held to a high standard, solidarity plays a central thematic role for the Grand 
Paris Express. However, the role of competition conflictingly presents an incongruence to 
the former theme of intercommunal solidarity. Calling forth a pact for jobs to fight urban 
sprawl, Ayrault claimed with the new Grand Paris, 250,000 jobs would be created191. 
Whilst encouraging competition, the urgency for renovation of the French Republican 
model seemed to pose itself as a grounding characteristic overall. Working to guarantee 
bettered lives, Ayrault claimed, “The new French model needs to be incorporated to a 
higher level particularly in this region [Ile-de-France], the most rich of France, the most 
populated but also the most contrasted.”192 With this resolution, the governing bodies of 
France seem to want to ameliorate the economic disparity not only for decreasing 
unemployment but also to improve the current image of the French model. Long critiqued 
as needing a change, the Republican model is metamorphosizing to an extent.  
 
A New French Model for Solidarity 
 
 Resulting from similar prose of solidarity and competition, the French 
government has placed youth as the cornerstone of a new French model. The state claims 
it will take measures for providing them with tools and more means to succeed, the state 
is taking measures to improve administrative policy so that all youth have equal 
opportunity.193  The discourse presents the connectivity of youth to employment and the 
need to reformat their solidarity and aid. It appears to be mainly ineffectual political 
speech. However, it also holds a responsive address to the explicit inequalities between 
employment opportunities for youth in the region. In their power, the state is fine-tuning 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Ayrault, “Le Nouveau Grand Paris: pour une Region Competitive et Solidaire” Translation is 
my own.  
192 Ayrault, “Le Nouveau Grand Paris: pour une Region Competitive et Solidaire” Translation is 
my own. 
193 Gouvernement.fr “La jeunesse au cœur du nouveau modele français” Translation is my own.  
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their impression as a state while also espousing merely discursive and circuitous 
elaborations to those who are disadvantaged. Looking at the directive from high state 
authorities, there is something lacking in terms of their general understanding of the 
nature of relationship for residents in the Île-de-France. Nonetheless, while arguably 
presented as “talk” and long-winded speeches, their divisive political and legislative 
power helps moderate collective discrimination and prejudice.  
 The Grand Paris Express appears sustainable and unifying in its logic, yet only 
when abstracted from the spatial practices of domination from the state-led association.  
However, by maintaining the need for an open democratic discourse, the Société du 
Grand Paris is attempting to impose both social and economic profit to the project. For 
example, as written in a declaration extrapolating on article 2 of the law from June 2010,  
it states:  
« Chacun a enfin pu exprimer son assentiment ou son opposition, mais également 
ses interrogations, ou ses propositions durant les quartre mois du débat présenté 
ci-dessus, permettant ainsi au président de la CNDP, de souligner que ‘differents 
débats publics ou concertations recommandées on déjà été organisés en région 
Île-de-France. Ils ont concerné aussi bien des projets de transport en commun, 
d’infrastructures routières que d’équipements de nature industrielle194 »  
 
The declaration takes on an appeasing tone, encouraging each party and citizen affected 
to express their concerns and visions for the Grand Paris Express. Unlike the mandated 
housing laws and social policies of the late 90’s and early 2000’s, for the communes in 
the Ile-de-France, a further opened discourse takes on an almost pacifiable air to the 
concerned and distressed public. 195  To further place emphasis on the need for 
progressive discussion, the state acknowledges the “different public debates and 
consultations” taking place. This leaves much to be said for an impression of openness 
concerning the Grand Paris Express. As current reports distributed by the Société du 
Grand Paris publicize, monthly and annual commune meetings are available for residents 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 Déclaration by Article 2 de la loi du 3 juin 2010 relative to Grand Paris. Societedugrandparis.fr 
195 See, for example, Dikeç’s piece, “Two Decades of French Urban Policy: From Social 
Development of Neighbourhoods to the Republican Penal State” where he argues late policy has 
intensified regulation through both social and penal policy-making (60). 
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and their respective lines of transit affected.196 It would appear that representatives for the 
Grand Paris facilitate public engagement. As far as the agenda that is being advanced, it 
is hard to say how effectively every group’s issues can be met. For example, recent 
concerns over the enormous costshave created growing dissension from multiple mayors 
and regional directors. 197  Additionally, departments demanding funding and appropriate 
gridding of lines, namely Seine-St-Denis, have encountered numerous obstacles coming 
to agreements with directors of other departments. The inability to equally cover financial 
costs by each department reflects the outstanding level of inequality within each 
department. 198  Yet by the nature of the project, all of the departments have a co-
dependence on the other by connecting regionally through rail lines.  
 
Seducing Outsiders in: The Process of Integration for Paris’s Grands Ensembles 
 
 Observing the evolution of the Grand Paris Express is my desire to hear the 
opinions for its expected outcome. Is a massive transit system an apparatus for change? 
Does entering a public, mobile structure immediately benefit and foster the means of 
integration and access? Measuring a transit system’s potency for social diversity and a 
more plural society is debatable. However, scholarship has looked at it in the past.199 
More meaningful though, is looking at the cultural significance of these orbital corridors. 
In France, as I discussed previously with Martin Dassieu, the concept of rail lines is 
economical, efficient, and sustainable. The French respect and admire their rail modes of 
transport. In American studies, rail lines pose an economic deficit to the state.200 Due in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 In a recent press release, the Societe du Grand Paris reported, “Grand Paris goes back to 
inhabitants for the new stages of consultation” 21 meetings were scheduled for debate on the red 
line.  
197 See, Vincendon, “Nouveau Grand Paris: et maintenant les Calculs”  
198 See, Vincendon. “Ligne 14: la Société du Grand Paris fait des avances aux Departments”  
199 See De Palma, Marchal (2002). In their literature they discuss the applicable methods of large 
scale transport in the Parisian area. In comparative analysis they critically examine possible 
simulations and the benefits of mass transit for equilibrium. 
200 See “Why American transport projects cost so much” and Nate Silver’s “On the Economics of 
Mass Transit and the Value of Common Sense” where findings from the Brookings Institute as 
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part to differing state infrastructures and fuel resources, I argue there is an additional 
cultural appeal of circular movement and connectivity in France. Dating back to 
Haussmann’s carrefours, which moved traffic efficiently in Paris, the Grand Paris 
Express takes part in circular routing as well.201 This is not, as Enright (2012) deems 
exclusionary but inclusionary.202 Communities are formed in many ways. Their spatial 
inequalities come up through economic and ethnic divides. This is clearly apparent in the 
Île-de-France region. Relocating mobility outwards via the Grand Paris Express leaves 
these communities asking: Is the Grand Paris Express something to be wary of? Or is it 
something to be excited for?  
 I will end this chapter by looking at the sociology around social capital, developed 
by Robert Putnam’s piece, Bowling Along: America’s Declining Social Capital.203 
Scholars have since looked at the value behind social capital, defined as the use of 
networks between individuals and communities to garner social participation, mutual 
assistance, and trust. In its broad terminology, the theory has since been examined 
through several other lenses. Scholars Graham Currie and Janet Stanley present findings 
of possible ties between social capital and public transportation systems. Their thesis 
argues that public transport can provide mobility and, by doing so, provide a greater 
opportunity to create social networks, trust, and reciprocity. Defined, social capital 
remains an abstract concept to measure. Currie and Stanley write that because it is 
abstract, it is only considered to exist where all three elements, (networks, trust and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
well as Bloomberg View weigh the pros and cons of public transport in American cities. Note: I 
want to emphasize here that this is transit data analysis from statistics in the United States. In 
comparing American transit to the Île-de-France region and France at large it is important to note 
that resources and capital are invested in economically different ways for transportation in the 
two countries. However, it presents an intriguing piece of debate on mass transit systems in the 
world.  
201 Saalman 34. 
202 See in particular chapter 2, where she discusses at length the idea of economic crowding out 
from the neo-liberal positioning of the corridors.  
203 Currie, Graham and Stanley discuss Putnam’s concept of social capitol in their piece,  
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reciprocity) are found.204 In grounding their argument, they assert two qualifiers to 
connect the ties between social capital and transit:  
“1. Public transport provides mobility which can enhance social interaction and hence act 
to build SC.  
2. Transit is often targeted to transport disadvantaged groups, for example, the young, 
low-income, aged unemployed who by definition tend to lack SC” (538)  
 
Plainly stated, these two constituents for an interconnected community encompass many 
interpretations and analyses. Under these two assertions, the Grand Paris Express project 
serves as an interesting lense to examine.  
Their second claim addresses an important economic factor in the fractured Île-
de-France region. As I looked at earlier, the costs of putting in the lines is expensive for 
the Île-de-France region. However, the lines connect many economically diverse areas in 
the Île-de-France, potentially leading to a decline of its East and West split. A hopeful 
objective, for the unemployed youth, mobility could give them avenues of entry.  
 I just addressed Currie and Stanley’s second claim for the targets of mass-transit 
and their capacities. Yet this is not the claim that I am most worried about. From my 
findings and observations, there is an underlying crux to French civil society which 
sharply divides them from the American ideology of social capitol. That is, that social 
capitol does not exist in France. I will say more on this in my conclusions.  
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Concluding Thoughts: Questions and Hopes for The Grand Paris Express 
 
  A sense of belonging and pride is crucial for a neighborhood’s residents. People 
hold dependence between themselves and their community.  The impression of wellness 
enlivens the spirit of community. But in the Île-de-France, the grands ensembles and 
social housing establishments have remained in dire conditions. Change occurs, though in 
small increments and through grass roots moments. It is still at a pace of social 
progression that is difficult to quantify. In the end of my explorations I am left asking 
myself: Will railway lines bring life to these communities in the North-Eastern part of the 
Île-de-France? 
 I like to view things optimistically. I see this project as a distended gathering of 
ideas. At its base, the Grand Paris Express is founded on the uncontrollable rioting and 
civil unrest of 2005. In the years following, the narrative has been warped out of its 
history. People are eager to leave the riots in a remote and distanced past. However, 
questions continue to come up over the “Probleme des Banlieues” and how they will be 
fixed. State actors are at a point where they can no longer ignore the problems that rest on 
the city’s borders. The propositions and executions of the Grand Paris Express hold vital 
influence. It is an instrument of wealth, power and industry. Thus, it is undeniable that a 
political elite has a dominating force in its planning. However, I argue that what will 
come from these lines is a social and collective good. It is a thought that comes from two 
ideas I’ve noticed repeatedly in French debate.  
 
 France has two auras. On one side, it presents the ideology that France is a 
commonwealth or in French terminology, La république française. Citizens rest in its 
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cradle of welfare-driven entitlements and ordained laws representing the state’s égalité. 
Its physical landscape also defines the states welfare.  The buildings, streets, parks and 
transit networks are all symbols of a French idealism. They stand for equal and open 
public spaces. In spite of their representations, these spaces are not equal. The differences 
are present everywhere. In an architectural sense, France creates and breaks equality. At 
its height, its role as protector and bearer of benefits functions well. There is a semblance 
of structure to the prescriptions and policies laid out. The political elite put on the airs of 
a well-oiled machine that is impervious to urgent grates and jars. It is only when the 
state’s design bends and diverges that France’s contours and shadows of inequality show. 
There is an adamant sense of presentation to France. To this end, France appears 
untouched by the 2005 rioting because of a staunch belief that their social goods are 
equally accessed by all. But the roles have now been contested and the environments 
have changed, as exemplified in the rioting. A dialogue is forming between political 
actors.  
 In a fortuitous encounter, I was able to speak with a member of France’s political 
elite. Through the guest speakers on the European Union, I spoke briefly with former 
prime-minister Lionel Jospin. An open and kind man, he relayed to me that he was not up 
to date with the exact expected outcomes for the Grand Paris Express. But he did 
acknowledge that there were levels of differences and disagreements with a “ville au 
cœur” against an unequal polity and that it was a complicated issue.205 Noted even by 
high-level politicians, the split of political opinions is placed alongside a split of power. 
 In his lecture however, Jospin touched on larger issues affecting France and the 
European Union at large. His speech held echoes of France’s socio-political problems but 
in the larger scope of the European Union. Addressing its new structure, Jospin asserted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 Jospin described the disagreements using the statement, “ville au cœur” meaning heart of the 
city, and what I took to mean central Paris. Jospin, Lionel. Q&A following European Union 
lecture. 03/15/2013. See Appendix D. 
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that “Europeans must accept that sovereignty is mixing” (See Appendix A).  Mixing and 
all that it connotes is being projected by a wide array of people on a wide array of levels.  
The power of mixing brings forth the power of an engaged discussion. 
Throughout all of my interviews, I found similar streams of thoughts coming from 
everyone despite their different backgrounds. In my talk with Marwan, he repeatedly 
brought up the value of debate with political figures and mainstream commentators. He 
reasoned that with rational discourse there is a positive impact with a changed behavior 
from those involved. Indeed, on the same plane as Jospin, Marwan spoke at length about 
the European Union and how it holds a constitutive power to addressing the social 
problems facing individual states. Seeing a fundamental dilemma to all countries Marwan 
noted that,  “any government is the least capable of seeing and analyzing the prejudice 
that is created by itself” (See Appendix A). What both Jospin and Marwan iterate is a 
blending of ideas without having to take away individual identities. 
These shared ideas are far larger and abstracted than the initial goals of the Grand 
Paris Express. Tying it all back to spatial connectivity is my idea of public transport 
serving as a space for conversation. Inspired by Marc Augé, an ethnographer who applies 
his theories to political science, I attribute human proximity and the shared space of a 
train as adding to the togetherness of Paris and the Île-de-France. In his argument, Augé 
explains,  
“Transgressed or not, the law of the metro inscribes the individual itinerary into 
the comfort of collective morality, and in that way it is exemplary of what might 
be called the ritual paradox: it is always lived individually and subjectively; only 
individual iteneraries give it a reality, and yet it is eminently social, the same for 
everyone, conferring on each person this minimum of collective identity through 
which a community is defined.”206 
 
To recall the image of what these lines resemble in nature, they are multi-ringed, 
interweaving throughout the region. Unlike the 1978 peéripherique highway, which is 
experienced individually by car, the train aspect, like Augé’s law of the metro, invokes a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 Augé, 30. 
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collective morality that all citizens are able to share. For the banlieues and their hurried 
construction, the rail lines bring to the neighborhoods something that is nostalgically 
French, while also prominently new.  
Unfortunately however, it is here that I raise my previous worries from Currie and 
Stanley’s (2008) transit social capitol argument. In France’s social context, beginning 
these conversations will be difficult. For while there exists a collective morality, there is a 
tenacious insularity within French society. It was an observation I saw while on the buses 
and trains in France. They were relatively silent. People observed one another but there 
were rarely animated conversations between strangers. Chance encounters and 
unexpected talks do not appear to happen in most public places. Thus, the “social 
interaction” that Currie and Stanley bring up occurs, but in an invariably different manner 
in France’s public areas. Hopes for enlivened discussions and exchanges on rail transit 
remains an additional facet to observe.  
 Remembering Soja (1980) in my introduction illustrates how a project like the 
Grand Paris Express can change and adapt the urban landscape. There is a connected 
social impact coming from these new lines that will alter the space of these communities. 
Worldwide, France is renowned for its mass-transit plans. Other cities look to Paris metro 
as the epitome of streamlined transit. Held in high esteem, its functioning has a 
distinguishable cultural significance to the French. They have a pride and ownership of it. 
By involuntary force, a positive cultural belief exists for its operation. While there are 
doubts that remain, the urban planning elite have deliberated out the benefits and costs. In 
deciding to go through, the French elite are endowing a sense of trust and cultural 
empowerment to those all around the Île-de-France region. It is a negotiation of sorts, 
where there are tactical and calculate ends. But there is an enduring level of commitment 
and reaching out, physically and metaphorically to give pride and belonging to those in 
the cités and banlieues.  
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  While some scholars (Enright 2012, Gonick, 2011) see this extension as a pseudo 
societal endeavor that will only further polarize the separate poles, I predict an organic 
establishment of trust. Ultimately, I think that is what this project is all about: creating 
trust. Here I am not speaking in economical terms, nor am I projecting levels of ridership. 
Cost of fares, speed, and efficiency are data that have yet to be analyzed. That line of 
inquiry cannot be accurately measured at this point in time. For my purposes, what I want 
to convey is the appreciable shared potential these lines will provide once created.  
As it plays out, I see the Grand Paris Express fulfilling a schema of togetherness. 
Where I learned the most from this project and where I suggest urban planning and mass 
transit planning needs are, is in connecting people through conversations. From the mere 
conversation alone, bonds of trust are established in talking about the same problems they 
seek to address.  
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APPENDIX A 
Transcript of Recorded Interview with Marwan Muhammad: Correspondant for 
Collectif Contre l’Islamophobia en France (CCIF) 
 
This appendix contains an interview I held with head organizer Marwan Muhammad. It 
presents the history of the organization and the work they do. In addition he discussed 
CCIF’s recent campaigning conducted in the Île-de-France region, and how they were 
received. Marwan presents cases of sociological discriminatory acts occurring in the Île 
region, as well as his opinions on the reception of Islamophobia in France. The questions 
and answers are designated from my initials (CL) and Marwan’s (MM). The interview 
was conducted in English through a skype call.  
 
CL  What is the purpose of your organization?  
 
MM  The collective against Islamophobia in France is a, is an organization, ah created 
to help and to support the victims of discriminations and of hate crimes based on 
uh uh, Islamophobic prejudice. Uh what do we define as Islamophobia? Well uh 
it’s uh any act of violence whether it be verbal or physic (physical), or 
discrimination targeting an institution, or an individual based on his or her uh 
alleged belonging to Islam. What does it mean? It means that some victims of 
Islamophobia can be non-muslims, uh people of uh, Seik religion for example, are 
often targeted because they are – they look like muslims, and for this reason the 
would be targeted for the same reason. Uh and also in this we do not include in 
this the questioning, the bringing into the question of religion by and large. So it 
means that uh, uh, people can question Islam as they question any other sort of 
religion, well it becomes a direct or an indirect attack on the, on, --the muslim 
citizens, then it becomes Islamophobia. [7:39]. So that is what we qualify as 
Islamophobia.  
 
CL  What year were you founded?  
 
MM The organization has been founded in 2003 and it was a context where the 2004 
law banning the hijab and the kibab in school was being discussed uh, in that time, 
but uh some, uh some intellectuals were uh, or some political figures were made, 
they made like uh, they made very bold statements that –and some of them 
coming out on tv and explaining uh how islamophobic they were and uh, how 
proud they were of that. So uh, we were, we saw many incidences of that, uh 
happening in the, in the streets of France, and uh victims, not having anyone to 
turn to, to get support, so that’s how the, that’s how the collective against 
islamophobia has been created. [8:36] 
 
CL  What resources and services do you offer those you serve?  
 
MM  The resources and services we offer to the victims is basically –first psychological 
and legal support. So uh we advice them in what they should do. We help them 
obtain their, have their rights respected. So for example we will discuss with 
perpetrators or discriminators, people who discriminate them to try to to, --to see 
if there is a solution to the, to the problem. For example, there is a –if there is a 
restaurant, banning women wearing the hijab, uh. At the entrance of the restaurant, 
we need to call these guys and say “hey, maybe what you wanna know what 
you’re doing is plainly illegal, are you sure you want to do this?” And so most of 
the time they will change their behavior. Sometimes they will stay in their, you 
know in their, in the same attitude, they –in which case we encourage the victim 
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to filing a formal complaint to the police. So number one provide uh, 
psychological support. Number two provide, uh [interjection “legal counsel”] uh 
legal support, uh and number three gather data because uh, the one thing we need 
is to be able to quantify the phenomenon of, like if we’re talking about one, two, 
incidences, these are just stories. But if we are talking about hundreds of cases 
throughout the country than this becomes a phenomemon. And we’re able to 
substantiate it, to explain the dynamics of it, the trends of it, uh, the proportion of 
women being targeted, uh and this has an explanatory power and this allows us to, 
to, bring the cases forward at the national level. And the last uh, the last two 
points on the, on our services is that one of our key missions, you know is to raise 
awareness, cause uh you know the same way anti-Semitism is not the problem of 
the Jews, it’s the problem of the white community, the community at large. Well 
the same goes for Islamophobia. It doesn’t affect just the muslims, it affects the 
society as a whole because it uh, it damages the relationships between fellow 
citizens. And it turns people, one against the other. And so raising awareness you 
know in the general population on these issues, is a, is a key task. Why? Because 
uh, because we will not succeed at all, we will not have political – we will not be 
able to convince the governments and the political figures of the country to 
change their behavior in a context where uh, the uh, political scene, is so 
entrenched in, into right wing, and sometimes –most of the time, extreme right 
wing ideological backgrounds. And so what we see uh is that we need to make 
this message clear and this message loud to the population. [11:37] 
 
CL  What is the message of Nous Sommes La Nation?  
 
MM  And that’s why, number four, we builded, the the, national communication 
campaign that we launched in, in November, that was called Nous Sommes La 
Nation. And the message behind it if you –if you look at the slogans of it, was 
nous sommes aussi la nation. We too are a part of this nation, uhh as we are. 
Without changing our identity. Without having to change our beliefs. Without 
having to blend in or to get rid of anything that constitute our identity. We are part 
of this nation, and we are –we contribute to this nation on an everyday basis. We 
are doctors, we are architects, we are social workers, we are plumbers, uh we are 
electricians, we are ladies and men participating in the larger white society as we 
are. And we do not uh, need to forsake our religion, uh abandon our religion or 
our identity or our history to be a part of this nation. And so the message 
is..respect is something that comes unconditionally –it doesn’t come with 
condition, it has to --respect is to respect the other as he is and not as I would like 
him to be. And so muslim citizens in france do not have, they do not have 
[coughs] sorry, they do not have to negotiate or they do not have to convince that 
they are a part of this society. They are a part of this society. And so this key 
message was a core part of the message of the campaign. Now the way that we 
did it. Is that we started first it, by analyzing, how is Islamic prejudice built, how 
is it built. And we discovered, part of it is ideological. So we have thinkers, 
politicians, activists building a speech, uh an ideology, that constitutes 
islamophobia, uh but they are an extreme minority. Uh the vast majority of 
perpetrators they are uh citizens, uh but you will find is that they are citizens, they 
have beliefs, and they uh, they indulge too much in the clichés in the—about the 
muslim population, these are clearly uh are, unfounded beliefs so, for example uh, 
muslim men are inherently violent, uh muslim women are submissive to their 
husbands, to their father, to their brothers, and they are forced to do this and that 
by their, uh by their male family. Uh Muslims have no sense of humor, uh 
muslims do not speak french and that’s normal because muslims do not belong 
here. Uh they are an alien part of this society, and they uh, they need to stay like 
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that that, and our identity is white –white judeo-christian. And that this is fixed 
and it can never be changed. And so they are the typical clichés that we are –that 
we observe in the, in the typical perpetrator profile. And what we’ve tried to do, 
what we’ve done is try to build this campaign around the clichés with a sense of 
humor, uh with an artistic tone. Uh and that’s how we came with the idea of the 
uh, the idea of building these posters uh and these videos, uh where we just go 
against the grain, uh and do not fall into the trap of like, replaying uh and 
reproducing the clichés that most muslims are accused of. And so uh we do –oh 
by the way the collectif against islamophobia is not a religious organization we 
are uh, we are kind of a civil organization of muslims, of jewish people, all 
together in the same NGO, but we campaign specifically on islamophobia 
individually. But we take part in other causes—for example I take part in the anti-
roma prejudice and the anti-semitism generally speaking and uh but the 
organization as a whole does not uh, is not uh, a religious one, or a religiously 
affiliated one. [15:51] 
 
CL  How was your campaign, Nous Sommes La Nation received by the news and 
media?  
 
MM  Was your  campaign receieved well by the news and the media? It had a 
massively positive impact and positive feedback from this campaign. Uh because 
uh the tone was balanced, because we were able at the same time to have, to –to 
have rational discouse, a sense of humour then it was a complete success with the 
with the press. Of course, pointing problems at the campaign, saying things like 
“you’re not a part of the nation. Porting a beard or wearing the hijab, where you 
are typically excluded from the uh, from the typical french identity. But they were, 
uh they were clearly appearing as uh, as indulging into an ideology, and not uh, 
not a, not being rational with the discourse. So uh in all of the interviews I gave, 
in all the debates I had with political figures or, or with mainstream commentators, 
this all came out really really positively, and the visuals of the campaign were all 
over, they were all well-received. [interjection, “they seemed to be everywhere, 
all over billboards, down in the metro…] no they were, no, actually what 
happened is that, the, the –campaign. We had the campaign, I mean the broadcast, 
the advertising campaign it went all around the peeripherique, which is the ring, 
the ring road around the –around Paris, and uh initially we wanted to have uh, we 
wanted to have the campaign in the metros. But the agency in charge of allocating 
the advertisement space in the metros said, uh ‘fighting Islamophobia is a 
religious thing and uh we should uh, we should not see any women wearing the 
hijab, uh –headscarf in the metro for the sake of what we call in France laïcité. 
And so clearly the director of the agency was uh, was doing exactly, was 
discriminating us based on the fact that we are an Islamic organization. So 
basically, they were trying to, to uh, to uh forbid the campaign from going on in 
the metro, which is basically equating to discriminating an organization, fighting 
discrimination. So uh, so what we did is we uh kept this silence for two weeks of 
the…of the beginning of the campaign because we had advertisement space all 
across Paris and around. Plus we uh had the national radios and the and the, and 
some tvs. And, in the middle of the campaign, we get the information uh, leak that 
the, so we basically uh we published, we gave away some of the, some of the 
information to the press. It was massively positive for us because we are, because 
we had the debate, why is it so taboo to say that there is islamophobia in France? 
Why is it so taboo that even the, that an agency like the metro would uh, would, 
an advertising agency would take an ideological stance about these uh, these 
posters and what is, why is it so taboo to, to admit that the french society today is 
diverse, and that you will have among them, uhh, people of Indian background, 
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people of Eygptian background, uh people of different religions some of them 
manifest this religion through uh, through different choices like dress codes, and 
we need to live with that. That is called diversity. And France, which is supposed 
to be the country of human rights, has to, has to respect that at some point. And so 
it was really uh, really a good thing to use uh during the campaign. But I mean 
overall the, the the reaction of the media was overly positive and one of the 
reasons for that is that now the word ‘islamophobia’ is widely spread in the media 
and each one of them now is having a, a debate on how, on how –what is 
islamophobia, how does it manifest itself in, in France. It is uh, inviting people to, 
to engage in the discussion which never happened in the past because the 
mainstream ideology was this islamophobic ideology, was the fact that, uh for a 
women to uh, just to, to decide to wear a headscarf is already past the red line. Uh 
for you guys in the U.S. or for you guys [20:49] in the UK, or any country in the 
world, it is normal for someone to to respect his neighbors or his colleagues 
religious choice whether he wears a turban or a kipa, or she wears a headscarf. 
But in France it is the complete opposite of that. So uhhh 
 
CL  How did you send out the message of Nous Sommes La Nation?  
 
MM Well as I said, number one the, the advertisement spaces around Paris. Number 
two, national radios, number three tv interviews and debates and number four, 
which was the key thing, is the social networks and website, having the website 
got a lot of interaction which in short, viral videos, and the national tour and 
conference where I set up appointments all across the country, uh at universities, 
local organizations, local town halls and I debated with local authorities and 
citizens all coming together, to discuss this. [21:56]  
 
CL Where do you see high levels of Islamophobic acts occurring in the Île-de-
France?  
 
MM  Well basically, at the national level there is a concentration of anti-muslim hate 
crimes, uh in major cities. Of course statistically there is uh, there is a clear bias in 
that in, the more people there are, the higher the chances are to see an act. Also 
the fact that wherever you see a muslim population is over-represented, then you 
see that that there is an over representation of uh, of hate crimes because there are 
more visible and because they are just there. So uh,  in the, in the Île-de-France, 
uh what we see is that there is, uh that the areas where we see there are more, 
have uh uh, have very low diversity, there will be an environment where people 
are encouraged to act against Muslims. So for example if you have a residential 
area in Paris, 6th which is very fancy, and you see a muslim woman wearing a 
headscarf and she’s all alone in there. And people will be tempted to treat her 
there, like, as if she wasn’t welcome there. So if she enters a bakery or if she goes 
to the city hall to ask for some papers we will find that there is a, some some 
prejudice sometime. So looking at the, looking at the stats, first we need to know 
that 87% of the hate crimes are targeting, are targeting women, and then, a 
proportion between forty and forty-five with the perpetrator being a civil servant. 
So that being a school or in a university or in the city hall, and most of the time it 
will become a minor discrimination because people are just not aware of the law, 
but it shows that even in the, within the public administration, there is prejudice, 
and there is institutionalized prejudice by the fact that employees and 
professionals are not trained in human rights, and religious freedom, in freedom in 
religion. [24:16] 
 
CL  What types of acts occur?  
	  	  
109	  
 
MM  A typical one is a woman being banned from a public space, uh a restaurant, a 
gym, a professional training center where someone would think, that, just based 
on his opinion, he can, that muslim women or a jewish person based on his dress 
code. That it is completely legal, and that it is completely misunderstanding the 
2004 law. Uh the 2004 law uh bans, and religious, uh any visibly relgious sign, 
from public schools, uh all the way from primary school up between the 
baccalareaut. Uh, but this is not, it doesn’t apply, outside this environment, so 
people are not allowed to, to implement a veil ban or kibab ban in any public 
space without any specific law to that, so for one case you will have uh muslim 
women, assaulted in the streets, uh someone taking off their headscarf, spitting at 
them, insulting them, you will find uh men being fired, from their job, if their 
manager knows that they are muslim, and finds that they, I don’t know are using 
their lunch break to pray. So they think its okay to go take a coffee, its okay to go 
smoke a cigarette but its not okay to pray. And people will be fired on that basis. 
You will find that some companies they apply a specific kind of treatment, to 
their employees when they know that these employees are muslim. Um whether it 
be like, holidays, policies, or dress code [uncomprhensible] it will be like very 
specific to these uh, to these employees. Another typical case will be a, a mosque 
uh being damaged. Someone hanging a broke head on the door and tagging like, 
tagging nazi, uh signs on the walls of the mosques or urinating in the, in the 
moques. Profanating cemetaries. So these are, these are more and more frequent, 
in the country. [26:45] 
 
CL  What are the highest number of complaints the CCIF receieves?  
 
MM  Well, actually there are, from 2012 we have 369 cases and that’s the highest, uh 
the highest number of complaints we have received in a year. Uh so far, and this 
is also completely underestimated for many reasons. First off, when they are 
humiliated they are, uh they underreport, uh they take hate crimes are the, arduous 
soul that they have been enduring, and uh its most visible generally speaking, 
outside of islamophobia, its most visible with any type of crimes, which uh, 
which has uh uh a humiliating impact. Rapes, insults, degredation, harcon. Uh 
these uh, these crimes, go underreported, why? Uh because uh because the 
victims they have interiorized, some of the some of the violence, and the 
prejudice. Second, everyone knows that this is illegal, so a lot of the victims they 
think that they just need to live with it. Uh that they just need to accept uh, that 
they just need to, uh accept it, that, that is a part of the prejudice too.  
 
CL  Where do those involved in CCIF experience the most segregation or hate 
speech?  
 
MM  Uh we see that the, the hot spots of Islamophobia, number one, media. Number 
two, political discourse, uh especially on the right wing. And number three 
unfortunately, uh uh uh, civil, uh sorry, administration.  
 
CL  Are there areas in the Île-de-France where the CCIF sees high levels of 
segregation or hateful acts? If so, where?  
 
MM  No, not uh, not a specific area, not a specific area. But there is a specific time, 
which is usually any period, any point in the media where there is a political 
discourse, of hate speech, in the media. So we see a direct uh, correlation, 
between a public debate targeting, or stigmatizing a muslim, and a rise in the anti-
muslim anti-bigotry acts in the next few days. Uh we don’t draw a causal link 
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between the two, but there is a clear, uh statistical correlation between the, 
between the two.  
 
CL  Are there parts of the Île-de-France generalized as places of Islamic or Arab 
residences? If so, where?  
 
MM  Okay so uh there is something very, uh very specific about the uh, about France 
that you need to, that you need to understand and that is very different from uh, 
from the U.S. It’s that here the idea of uh, of community, or a Muslim community 
is relatively taboo. Uh so uh, so we don’t say that uh, this is a black neighborhood 
or this is uh an arab neighborhood or this is a, a white or predominately white 
neighborhood, we don’t usually use this categorization uh in France. But what we 
see, is that the the religious belonging, or that the ethnic or cultural belonging of 
an individual has no statistical explanatory power to draw a map and say like this 
is uh an arab place or an Islamic place, but what we can do, what we can say is 
that the social economic status of the population has this explanatory power so 
because muslims and arabs are ovverepresented in the lower part of the social and 
economic game, then they will tend to live in places where they can afford it. And 
so because the, the we’re still first, second, third generation, uh immigrants, uh we 
have an overrepresentation of muslims in deprived areas. So if we, if we look at 
the…can you hear me? So uh there will be an overrepresentation of muslims and 
arabs in these neighborhoods. Such as third generation immigrants in these low-
income areas. This is changing rapidly, so uh in the, we are seeing, a change of 
distribution in the, in how the wealth is, what is typical for young muslim men 
and women, will have this, so this is rapidly changing over time. And there is still 
at the moment, and over representation of Muslims in deprived areas around Paris 
so uh this is maybe the arrondisements 91, 93, uh 94 for example.   
 
CL  Does the CCIF stage protests in Paris or the Île-de-France? If so, where? 
 
MM  Uh the answer is, generally, no. Uh because the protests will be uh manipulated in 
the media. Uh if we organize a demonstration in the in the, in central Paris, Just 
the the, multitude of hijabs, of bearded men,  or being brown, uh will be perceived 
as a security threat. And uh it would be shown, in the media as like the typical 
cliché of the angry arab, so uh we don’t want to to uh play that game, so uh so we 
decide to mobilize people and protest, we’ll be, we’ll target, we’ll be doing it in a 
very precise manner. Uh so for example the mayor is uh discriminating Muslims 
or we not that he is stigmatizing muslims, we’ll do a sitting, just in front of his 
city hall. Uh we’ll have a kinda of funny event, a sense of humour if you will, or 
we’ll organize a breakfast for workers just in the, in front of his, the city hall but 
we will not organize classical, typical protests in the street.  
 
CL  Are people ever refused service based on an Islamic tie? 
 
MM  Definitely. Definitely. We’ll have some working agencies, uh asking people to 
explain their religious practices and that offered them jobs based on that. We will 
have uh women, participating in the school life of their children to a certain extent. 
So for example we will say, ‘it’s okay , it’s okay if you bring cakes to school, it’s 
okay if you give money to fund, uh I don’t know the renewal of the library of the 
school but we don’t want you to take any visible part in the school life. Uh we 
don’t want to see your headscarves uh in the, anywhere near the school or in the 
school” So we have women, Muslim mothers, being banned from school events 
when they decide to wear the headscarf and this is basically like apartheid type of 
ideology. These are the muslims, these are the non-muslims, and we’re going to 
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base our judgement our inclusion based on their religious visibility. So there are 
services refused to some muslims, participation refused to some Muslims just 
because of their belonging to, to this religion.  
 
CL  Are there places in the Île-de-France where people do not feel comfortable going? 
Muslim wise you mean?  
 
MM  Or… [ CL: Yes I guess from both sides] basically, although they completely 
refuse the idea of ghetto, the idea of a predominately black or white area, still it 
works, so you will find that people living in Paris, within central Paris or a fancy 
residential area. They are scared to go in any suburb because they perceive uh 
these areas as uh like they are a zoo. And they are so scared to find themselves in 
a suburb, in a cité because they perceive black youth or arab youth as inherently 
uh dangerous dangerous to them. As a threat, and uh they behave with them like 
they were a threat, so in return, these kids to them say you are not in a zoo, we are 
human beings and as much as you hate us, well we hate you back. So we have 
like these forms of animosity between some of the youth living in the suburbs and 
some of the more posh areas uh as we have, which are completely segregated in 
terms of social life and inclusion. And so, a lot of, a lot of people feel 
uncomfortable going into these places. And the same way in return you will find 
that a lot of the youth uh living in the suburbs don’t go to the center, to the Paris 
museums or uh to exhibitions, uh or a great historical libraries which are located 
in central Paris, even though some of them are free. Why? Because they think that 
they are not welcome there. Uh that they don’t belong that. That someone is going 
to come in and tell them, you were wearing these sneakers or that sport suit, you 
don’t belong here. And so that uh and sometimes that happens. So uh just for, for 
a kid to go to a museum or a very nice library or a fancy shopping center in Paris, 
if he’s black or arab, or if he looks muslim, or he looks like he might come from 
the suburb, he will be followed all around the shop to make sure that he is not 
shoplifting. He will be asked for an ID at the entrance of the museum and he will 
be asked by the security guards. And so clearly there is this, uh this sulf-fulfilling 
hatred and distance between fellow citizens based on this prejudice.  
 
CL  Has the CCIF witnessed any successful changes in their efforts against hateful 
statements and acts?  
 
MM  Yes. From the moment where we started participating in the, in the media, um 
debating on tv and the radio, uh some of the people I’ve been debating, they’ve 
changed their behavior and now its more taboo to make like bold anti-muslim 
statements on tv. And because more of us are now able to speak more publicly on 
tv, in french, and in a rational manner, its much more difficult for the right wing 
and for the left wing to some extent to build a false idea of these muslims living in 
France. They can’t be like oh look these people can’t speak french, and oh these 
people are violent, because we show the exact opposite. And so this uh, this 
changes the mentalities and this changes –this has an effect on these sort of 
statements.  
 
CL  Is the CCIF involved in planning for the Grand Paris Express?  
 
MM   Charlotte I need to say that not many people are involved in that. The key issue 
here, and we’re not, we’re not involved in that for that matter but the key issue 
with the Grand Paris Express is that the transport network in the paris suburbs 
also participates in the exclusion of some minorities in the exclusion of some 
areas from the participation to the wider wider, Île-de-France social and economic 
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life, so the plan here is how do you do make sure, how can we tackle these issues, 
how can we build a network of transport that’s gonna bring these people into the 
society. But there is no discussion as far as I’m aware, based on how we are going 
to fight this exclusion of minority including, through the religious minority 
through the Grand Paris Express Project.  
 
CL   What are your future plans for further eliminating Islamophobia in France? 
 
MM  We are working hard now to convince the government to take a significant action 
in uh against islamophobia. So far, they have, up to the last few years been 
denying the phenomenon, and now they are starting to take it into account, and 
acting on it. But what we want to do first for 2013 is build a European network, 
an organization against islamophobia to gather data, hate crimes and 
discrimination, uh in order for us to be able to come up with coordinated action at 
the European Union level, within the European commission, because we know 
that this is very efficient when it comes down to convincing uh national 
governments on racism in France. Whether it be the EU or the UN. We have this 
international organization, and we don’t make the most of it from an NGO 
perspective, and then there is the bias. The general bias is that any government is 
the least capable of seeing and analyzing the prejudice that is created by itself. So, 
for example, uh the U.S.  are very reluctant to have kind of a clear, cold vision of 
the prejudice that they cause first to their fellow citizens and to the population 
abroad. So the UN is the right framework to frame this. And the same goes for 
France, and for a country like Japan. For example I was interviewing with a 
Japanese journalist, and he was excellent in pointing out the anti-semitism and 
islamophobia in France. Still he was completely unable to identity and form the 
kind of racism that the Japanese are [encountering] against Chinese minorities, 
against Korean minorities. And so that’s the, that’s the bias. The same goes with 
France on Islamophobia. It is much more efficient for a, for the U.S. to speak out 
against Islamophobia in france, for you kids to speak out against it in France, 
European Commision speak out against us, and say, you guys claim all across the 
globe that you guys are the country of freedom, of rights and equal respect but at 
the same time you are not even respecting this elementary freedom on your own 
soil. So come to some sense of reality and realize that in your country, they are 
part of your society and you need to live with that.  
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APPENDIX B 
Transcript of Interview with Martin Dassieu: Correspondant for PACT of Île-de-
France 
This appendix contains my informative interview with Martin Dassieu, a correspondant 
for the PACT housing renewal and lodging organization based in the Île-de-France région. 
It was conducted over a skype call and he provided clarifying information regarding the 
histories of housing in France, as well as the histories of France’s transit systems and 
expected outcomes for the Grand Paris. The questions and answers are designated from 
my initials (CL) and Martin’s (MD). Our communication was conducted in French.  
 
CL Pour le PACT, est-ce que ça c’est une acronyme?  
 
MD  Oui, c’est ça. Aujourd-hui, ça n’est plus un, je peux vous donnez des dates exact  
autour des dates. Et uh l’acronyme qui existait a été crée en 1930. Donc, c’était  
avant le deuxième guerre mondiale, et ça voulait dire, le P, ça veut dire, la  
propagonde, Le A, ça voulait dire action, et le C et le T, contre le eto-dice. Le eto- 
dice c’était bauis / Dauis, et ça voulait dire le mauvais logement. Voilà, donc  
c’etait la communication et de l’action, contre la problématique de mauvais  
logement pour rencontre en France, au début de XXsiecle.  
 
CL   Est-ce que ça est lié avec les grands ensembles qui a été crée par l’État ?  
 
MD   Alors, c’était avant, avant les grands ensembles. C’est vrai que, que au début de  
XXsiecle âpres la première guerre mondiale, en France, la première guerre  
mondiale a uh, destabilise forcement le pays, et a détruire beaucoup des villes.  
Les ville qui ont été à côté de l’Allegmagne, qui sont touché par la guerre, a eu  
beaucoup beaucoup des logements qui étaient détruits. Dans un première temps,  
Les associations, les avocations avait aidé, les propriataires, a reconstruisait leur  
logement. Donc on n’est pas encore à la problématique des grands ensembles,  
mais à partir des années 50s, 60s, uh âpres la deuxième guerre mondiale, il a fallut  
un nouveau construire la France et uh, ça à posent les questions des grands  
ensembles. Le PACT dans un premier temps, uhh, donc accompagnie la  
construction des grands ensembles, et il faut savoir qu’à partir des années 80s,  
90s, les grands ensembles où il était très problématique, puisque on a, il est les  
personnes le plus pauvre dedans, et là on a commencé une nouveau intervernir  
pour réhabiliter les grands ensembles, pour retravailleur sur les grands ensembles.  
 
CL   Est-ce qu’il y a un lieu spécifique un department spécifique que vous, que le  
PACT travaillé dedans ?  
 
MD   Alors, on travaille sur les 7 departments dans l’Île-de-France, mais il faut savoir  
que les problématiques sont différents. Les problèmes sont diffèrent par les  
departments. On a des departments qui sont assez connu en France qui s’appellent  
les seine-st-denis, uh, seine comme la rivere, et St-Denis, comme la ville St- 
Denis. C’est là qu’on a construit la plus des grands ensembles. C’est là que âpres  
la deuxième guerre mondiale, on a relogé, très forcement, les populations  
sinistrées, et aujourd-hui beaucoup de nos opérations de requalification urbain, de  
habitation loyer par l’état, sont realise par les scènes des ces departments. Donc,  
St-Denis, c’est le département, la plus pauvre, ou le département le plutôt plus  
jeune, et c’est le département où on a le plus construise pendant les années 50, 60,  
les grands ensembles.  
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CL   Par contre, c’est diffèrent aux Etats-Unis en ce qui concerne les banlieues. À  
cause de la délocalisation des villes, c’est au centre où on a le plus pauvres  
logements au contraire aux banlieues.  
 
MD   Oui, oui. C’est vraie qu’on a étudie que aux Etats-Unis, la ville américaine, à  
l’epoque où les centres villes des Etats-Unis sont retrouver populise a priori,  
puisque les gens voulaient vivre au banlieue, dans les résidences, qui n’étaient pas  
au centre ville. Uh en Île-de-France, pour les environ Paris, c’est qu’on appelle le  
banlieue « the suburbs » uh ça, a été, en fait construit, pendant un peu âpres, 20  
ans, des années 50 à 70s, et ça a été très diffèrent, sur le territoire, sur l’est de  
Paris, on a y a massivement les personnes pauvres, et à l’ouest de Paris, on y a  
massivement les personnes riches et aujourd-hui on se trouve en Île-de-France  
avec un context territoriale, qui est très diffèrent en fonctionne uh la localisation  
et generalment, on se rends compte que la même, types des constructions on a fait  
à l’ouest et à l’est, dont on n’a pas la même type de population. Et qu’on se  
retrouve pour un même type de construction, avec des populations très très,  
populise, donc très pauvre et  c’est vrai que sur une cote il y a des riches et sur les  
autres cotes il y a des pauvres. Voilà l’est, le nord-est, on peut faire un petit  
fracture entre le nord-est, uh le seine-st-denis et uh le sud-ouest, (si vous preverez  
je peux vous transmettre des documents qui montrent le context qui s’operé et je  
peux également vous transmettre des documents sur nos actions depuis, les années  
50, jusqu'à années 2000s). 
 
CL   En Posant des questions autour de la nouveau sujet du Grand Paris Express, avez  
vous quelques petits commentaires autour ce sujet ici ? Est-ce que vous pensez le  
Grand Paris Express est une bonne idée ? 
 
MD   Alors, oui parce-que aujourd-hui en Île-de-France on se retrouve uh confronte à  
un gros problème c’est que l’ensemble, l’ensemble des emplois sont situé à Paris,  
et l’ensemble de uh des personnes qui vivre en Île-de-France sont uh, situé [oh  
pardon mon telephone sonne] oui, comme je disais, c’est très important Grand  
Paris Express, parce-que ça permet de créer, uh de permettre, uh deux centralité,  
uh parce-que maintenant il y a seulement qu’un centralité, c’est la ville de Paris,  
et là vous avez tous les emplois. L’objectif est de créer des autres centralité pour  
pouvoir, mettre les emplois, ailleurs, qu’à Paris. Et uh, de coup il faut  
absoluement développer les réseaux transports. L’automobile, uh depuis les  
années 70s, et 80s, on a arreté des construisire, les auto-routes pour le voiture, et  
on a privilège les autres transports en commun, en Île-de-France on a vraiement  
un beau réseau transport en commun, et il va continuer a l’augemente parce-que  
avec le cout d’energie l’essence cout de plus en plus, plus cher, et uh, devienne  
très problématique de déplacer en voiture. Il n’y a pas de taxes pour le voiture, qui  
a mon avis, ça a été imaginable en France, uh mettre un tax pour le personne qui  
utilise leur voiture, mais il y a un diffèrent point, lorsque il y a trop de pollution,  
on interdit, certaines qui circulé, les voitures le plus polluant, les camions, les gros  
voitures, uh mais on n’a pas mis de taxe, pour le voiture, et nottament je sais qui- 
ce-passe, à Londre, ou à Berlin, où il y a des taxes pour rentrer dans la ville, uh  
pour utiliser les voitures, à Paris, on a fait quel-que chose diffèrent. Ce quand on a  
rendu, en fait uh, le transport pour le voiture c’est très diffèrent, très difficile, très  
compliqué, ce qui fait le personne n’utilise plus forcement, leur voiture parce-que  
c’est trop difficile de trouver une place de se-garerer, très difficile de circuler,  
donc plutôt on a essayé de décourager, pas taxer mais décourager, et on a  
explique,  que le transport en commun, le train, le métro, uh le diffèrent types de  
transport, uh sont moins cher, que la voiture, et c’est vraiement, moins cher que la  
voiture, et de l’autre part, c’est uh, c’est, pas forcement, si confortable. C’est  
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plutôt, le préoccupation écologique, il y a un vallée courant à ce moment,  parce- 
que l’energique cout de plus en plus cher, et il faut absoluement économiser l 
l’argent et pour économiser l’argent, les gens doive prendre le métro. Voilà.  
 
CL   Avec les organizations comme le PACT, à votre avis, est-ils sont efficaces pour  
les gens d’acquirer, et de louer les logements en Île-de-France ? 
 
MD   Alors, pour nous, on intervienne, sur les, qu’on apelle, le PACT privée. C’est qui  
uh, on viends, réhabiliter, retravailleur le logement, uh privée, pas de logement  
publique. Parce-que en France il y a deux types des logements, les logements  
publiques, qui sont construisait par l’état, et sont menes à la dispositions pour les  
personnes et les logements privée une systeme avec un properiataire, qui loue son  
logement à un autre personne qui alors, ou le properitaire occupe son logement.  
Nous on intervienne seulement avec les PACTS privées, et on, trois actions, le  
premier action, est trouver l’argent, parce-que aujourd’hui en France il y a des  
aides, il y a des subdivesions, par ailleurs on realise l’assistance, milite le projet,  
on a des architects on a des engineers, on a des technicians, qui vont réaliser, les  
bons travaux, finir les travaux, à réaliser le logement, et donc voilà. C’est passer  
par nous, déjà l’argent, et par l’état, le pouvoir de faire le projet, uh très technique,  
sans forcement recourir, a des entreprises spécialisées, on est une association  
democratif, fédéral général, passer par nous, on est, ça veut dire, le qualité sans  
forcement, payer très chèr. C’est économique en deux sens.  
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APPENDIX C  
Notes from Correspondence with Marie-Camille Raffin, Head of Press for 
Solidarités Nouvelles pour le Logement 
 
This appendix contains my correspondence with Marie-Camille Raffin, the head of press 
and communications for the French NGO group, Solidarités Nouvelles pour le Logement. 
Our correspondence was through e-mail because of technical problems connecting 
through international calling. The questions and answers are designated from my initials 
(CL) and Marie’s (MR). Our communication was conducted in French.  
 
CL  J’ai vu le reseau qui montre où sont les logements en Île-de-France. Dans le 
dossier, il dit qu’il a cinq associations départementales à Paris, Yvelines, Essonne, 
Hauts-de-Seine et Val-de-Marne. Mais, il y a des autres logements partout la 
region, comme dans le reseau? Comment est-ce que SNL decider où de placer les 
logements? 
 
MR SNL est bien présente dans 5 départements. Elle a quelques logements également 
en Seine-Saint-Denis, mais nous n’y avons pas d’association départementale. 
Nous ne sommes pas présents ailleurs. Ce sont quelques bénévoles qui se 
réunissent pour créer un logement, elles cherchent un logement, ensuite elle 
réunissent l’argent (dons, subventions et prêts) pour l’acheter puis font les travaux 
nécessaires avant d’y installer quelqu’un. Les bénévoles se réunissent par quartier, 
pour être proches des personnes qu’ils logent.  
 
CL Dans l'historique, la loi Besson qui permet aux associations de bénéficier de 
subventions publiques, pour le logement social. À quelle année a-elle été crée? 
Une subvention, est-elle la même à une subsidaire? 
 
MR La loi Besson a été créée en 1990. Par contre, nous n'avons pas compris la 
deuxième partie de la question. Pouvez-vous me la repréciser, s'il vous plait ? 
 
 
CL  En ce qui concerne la loi de Besson. Avec cette loi, à peu après elle a été crée, 
votre organisation, a-elle reçu des fonds pour aider avec ses logements 
provissionels? Et aussi, est-ce que vous pensez il y avait une certaine ligne entre 
la SNL à l'année quand elle a été crée et le moment quand la loi de Besson a été 
établi?  
 
MR  Grâce à cette loi, depuis 1990 SNL a reçu de nombreuses subventions pour 
financer la création de logements pour les plus démunis. aujourd'hui, ces 
subventions finance en moyenne ~65% du montant des logements (~10% de prêt 
long terme, ~25% de fonds propres). Avant 1990, SNL a financé quelques 
logement en fonds propres (dons de particuliers, amis, voisins...). 
 
CL Environ combien de temps est le moyen durée d'une locataire à leur logement 
temporaire?  
MR  En moyenne, un locataire reste dans le logement temporaire 3 à 4 ans. 
 
CL  Après ils sont reinstallé dans la société où est-ce qu'ils habitent?  
 
MR  Les bénévoles de SNL qui accompagnent les locataires les aident à trouver un 
logement social ensuite (type HLM par exemple). 
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CL  Ces logements temporaires, sont-ils publiques ou privés? 
 
MR  Ces logements temporaires appartiennent à SNL et sont donc privés. 
 
CL  Avec l'engagement civic, specifiquement l'accompagnement des personnes logées, 
est-ce que les personnes sont donné une relation de SNL? Quelles types de conseil 
sont offert?  
 
MR  Les bénévoles et les travailleurs sociaux de SNL accompagnent les locataires. Les 
travailleurs sociaux les guident dans les démarches à effectuer et suivent leurs 
dossiers. Les bénévoles partagent une vraie relation avec le locataire. Ils les 
visitent régulièrement, prennent des nouvelles, ils leurs donnent des conseils sur 
la manière de faire des économies de charges, comment gérer leur logement... 
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APPENDIX D  
Notes from France’s former Prime Minister Lionel Jospin’s Lecture: “Europe: a 
Continent in Decline or a Model for the Future?” 
 
This appendix contains notes from Lionel Jospin’s lecture in addition to my conversation 
with him about the current affairs of the Grand Paris Express. I do not include his entire 
lecture. In sum, he spoke at length about the economic crisis affecting Europe and the 
adjustments individual countries were taking to meet social and fiscal conditions in the 
European Union. Lionel Jospin’s initials: LJ indicates his speech. My initials CL indicate 
my correspondence with him.  
 
LJ We have received realistic indicators that the European markets are connected. It 
would now be wise to plan this European turnaround over several years. Rating agencies 
and markets would force us to link as markets the gross perspectives of our debts and 
realistic indicators, to get around the markets, shorten progressions and divorce radical 
methods would cease. [For the EU] to promote again to lend to their states but here we 
have fallen at our attempt, claiming that the European central bank could buy more of the 
European Union’s states soverign debt on the secondary market and the Fed, the bank of 
England or the bank of Japon. It would also be wise to modulate economic policies in a 
now heterogenous European states according to national objectives. A common policy is 
not a single policy. Countries that have strong indicators of a weak budget deficit like 
Germany could follow less restrictive economic policy around other unsteady countries. 
The EU has estimated budgetary control mechanisms. It is now setting up a banking 
union in Europe, a gross policy to leave the prices behind more quickly. I know that some 
people believe that the reasons for Europe’s economic problems go deeper. For them, 
Europe’s social and economic model are at fault, with labor costs that are too high, and 
social welfare systems that are too heavy to control the new conditions of competitive 
global competition. I’m not convinced. First of all this model has already been partially 
altered over the last years in the name of economic neo-liberalism without weighing out 
competitvy…Whats more, a reversal would be nonsensical perspective…We are entering 
a period in which production costs are ebbing out, it would thus be paradoxical to not 
having forced such a change Europe would backtrack [pause to find place] Europe can 
adapt its model but it must not renounce it…the economy must serve all human beings. It 
would be absurd to forget…Europeans must accept that sovereignty is mixing. It can no 
longer accept itself as one sole nation and it cannot be embodied in one single Europe. To 
my mind, Europe must perfect its institution from the notion of shared sovereignty…from 
our model, I would call the democratic paradox. The European people who live in 
democracies at home fear a lack of democracy on the European union level. The 
European Parliament is elected by universal suffrage, by all the citizens of Europe but it 
does not have the force of a real Parliament. For example, it cannot levy taxes…European 
leaders should propose clearer functioning plans to their people, in which democratic 
groups would be respected on all levels. A connection with national parliament would 
most likely be the solution to this. The EU must choose about how it decides on its 
European organization. It cannot be an à la carte European Union because then it would 
unravel. It cannot be a two speed Europe that is distinguished between first class and 
second class countries. Because that would be against its very principle. It cannot close 
itself either into a search and consensus against others initiatives. The Union could, only 
at the same and level speeds. Each state would have its equal rights and 
responsibilities…[Speaking about Turkey] It is a question of how and when…such 
problems cannot be brought into the European Union. Turkey needs to solve its problems 
before it could join Europe if it still wishes to…In this uncertain 21st century that is 
unveiling out in front of us, if Europe  will be alongside the US it should note also its 
multiplicity and connections to all of the areas of the world. So listening to Europe might 
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be useful for the United States…For Europe, I would not be worried about its loss of 
strengths, only about its loss of meaning.  
 
CL Bonjour M. Jospin. Est-ce que vous avez une minute pour de poser une question 
parce-que maintenant je suis en train de rechercher le projet en Île-de-France le Grand 
Paris Express. Mais il semble qu’il y a beaucoup des conflits et débats autour de ce projet.  
 
LJ  Il faut que vous adressez, soit la marie de Paris, soit la région pour proposer des 
questions. Parce-que moi, je ne suis pas expert, ou spécialiste de Grand Paris Express. 
Mais regardez aussi la presse française parce-que elle surveille le projet.  
 
CL  Oui, bien sur, parce-que il semble qu’il y a deux côtes de ce projet. 
 
LJ  Oui, surtout, il y a une supposition de pouvoir une opposition, Il y a la ville du 
cœur et puis les autres qui ne sont pas équilibres politiquement. Donc c’est une question 
complique.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
